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INTRODUCTION 
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion was the worst man-made 
environmental disaster in United States history .1 This singular event caused 
the death of eleven rig workers, damaged, perhaps irreversibly, the coast-
lines and ecosystems of five Gulf States, and imposed financial ruin on the 
tens of thousands who relied upon a functional Gulf of Mexico for their 
livelihood.2 Left in its wake is a massive and complex web of high-stakes, 
multi-district litigation which will seek to determine how and why so cata-
strophic an event could have occurred, attribute fault among the various 
responsible parties, compensate those damaged by the harm, and sanction 
those responsible.3 When the litigation dust settles, the cumulative damages 
awarded and penalties assessed will likely be the largest ever in a mass tort 
case. 
I. See PETER LEHNER & BOB DEANS, IN DEEP WATER: THE ANATOMY OF A 
DISASTER, THE FATE OF THE GULF, AND ENDING OUR OIL ADDICTION 11-12, 89 (The Experi-
ment 2010). 
2. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING vi 
(2011) [hereinafter OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT]. 
3. Denise M. Pi lie, Satisfying Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims: Will Ken Fein-
berg's Process Work?, 58 LA. B.J. 176, 178 (20 1 0). 
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The primary defendant in the Gulf oil spill litigation (BP litigation) is 
BP Exploration & Production, Inc. (BP), operator of the Macondo well 
where the spill originated. The predominant tort claims in the BP litigation 
are grounded in negligence. However, the determination of who will ulti-
mately bear the largest share of costs for this disaster will not necessarily be 
resolved within the traditional negligence framework. Rather, the most po-
tentially significant of these claims will hinge upon the court's interpreta-
tion and application of the terms "gross negligence" and "willful miscon-
duct," labels that have confounded courts and produced a litany of conflict-
ing and conflated definitions in the jurisprudence. 
The typical negligence action focuses on whether the defendant acted 
unreasonably without regard to the degree of negligence involved.4 Thus, 
courts are seldom required to determine whether defendant's behavior con-
stitutes ordinary negligence, gross negligence, or willful misconduct.5 The 
egregiousness of defendant's lapse in care is usually irrelevant to the deter-
mination of whether negligence liability attaches.6 Nor does the typical neg-
ligence case compel the trier of fact to specifically label defendant's degree 
of fault or to otherwise particularize its gradation. However, several of the 
most significant liability and damages issues in the BP litigation, as well as 
any potential criminal liability, will indeed require the court to determine 
whether the BP defendants' conduct transcends ordinary negligence and 
rises to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 7 Regulatory 
schemes, such as the environmental statutes at issue in this case, use these 
heightened degrees of fault as liability triggers to impose more severe pun-
ishment than would otherwise apply in a case of ordinary negligence.8 Con-
sequently, the gradation of negligence assigned to defendants' conduct in 
the BP litigation will have a profound impact upon the amount of compen-
satory damages awarded and civil penalties imposed under the relevant en-
vironmental statutes, the amount of punitive damages awarded under federal 
maritime and state tort law, BP's contractual indemnification obligations to 
its business partners, and, at least indirectly, the comparative allocation of 
fault amongst all the defendants.9 Simply stated, a finding of gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct will exponentially increase damages and sanc-
tions. Given its pivotal effect upon the ultimate costs defendants will pay, 
4. Edwin H. Byrd, III, Comment, Reflections on Willful, Wanton, Reckless, and 
Gross Negligence, 48 LA. L. REV. 1383, 1384 n.8 (1988) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL,. 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 213 (5th ed. 1984)). 
5. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 349 (2000); see KEETON ET AL., supra note 





See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 208-14. 
See discussion irifra Sections I.A-B. 
See discussion infra Section I.A. 
See discussion infra Sections I.A-B. 
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how the court categorizes the defendants' conduct is undoubtedly the single 
most important issue in the case. 10 
However, it will be extraordinarily difficult for the court to categorize 
the degree of defendants' fault applying existing jurisprudence interpreting 
the terms gross negligence and willful misconduct, particularly against the 
technically and factually complex setting of this case. Over the last 100 
years, courts have been unable to draw coherent distinctions between ordi-
nary negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct.'' The develop-
ment of workable lines of demarcation between this tripartite division of 
fault has proven to be so elusive that some states have abandoned their us-
age altogether. Several scholars have acknowledged the futility of categoriz-
ing degrees of negligence and questioned the need to do so. 12 Others have 
cast serious doubt on the conceptual soundness of attempts to define the 
terms gross negligence and willful misconduct in the first place. 13 
Despite the murky distinctions and lack of guidance surrounding these 
terms, they remain a vital component of the regulatory fabric of many state 
and federal statutory schemes that use them as triggers for augmented liabil-
ity, and, in some states, they are the predicate for awarding punitive damag-
es. 14 In light of their prevalent usage as a regulatory tool, clarified standards 
for degrees of negligence could serve as a potent deterrent to careless con-
duct and improve safety in future high-risk activities by providing better 
predictability of increased liability exposure for those enterprisers engaged 
in such activities. Given the magnitude of the BP litigation and the central 
role played by degrees of negligence as well as the inevitable regulatory 
effect the Deepwater Horizon incident will have on future high-risk activity, 
a workable analytical framework for applying degrees of negligence is sore-
ly needed. The goal of this Article is to provide such a framework. 
Part I explains why degrees of negligence are so vital to the outcome 
of the BP litigation, delineating precisely how the terms gross negligence 
and willful misconduct will drive every major damages and allocation of 
I 0. The magnitude and eomplexity of this litigation could mean that a final resolu-
tion will not occur for many years or even decades. However, the important process of des-
ignating the degree of fault may actually begin on January 14, 2013, the date the court has set 
to begin the first of three phases of a bench trial to determine limitations of liability, exonera-
tion, and fault allocation issues, including "negligence, gross negligence, or other bases of 
liability." In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," No. 2179 (E.D. La. 2011) 
(amended pretrial order). 
II. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 212 (citing Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 
N.W.2d 501,505 (Iowa 1981)); see also West v. Poor, 81 N.E. 960,960 (Mass. 1907); Mas-
saletti v. Fitzroy, 118 N.E. 168, 173-74 (Mass. 1917). 
12. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 210-11; DOBBS, supra note 5, at 350. 
13. See generally Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of "Gross Negli-
gence or Willful Misconduct," 71 LA. L. REV. 957 (2011) (offering an intriguing and compel-
ling interpretative framework for the terms "gross negligence" and "willful misconduct"). 
14. See discussion irifra Sections I.A-B. 
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fault decision in the case. This section also discusses the potential regulato-
ry implications degrees of negligence could have on future high-risk activi-
ties. The interpretative criteria the courts utilize for gross negligence and 
willful misconduct in this high-profile case will likely become the bench-
mark for future applications of these widely used terms. 
In order to lend some factual context to the abstract negligence theory 
discussed in subsequent sections, Part II describes some of the key alleged 
acts of negligence that led to the explosion aboard the Deepwater· Horizon 
oil rig, including decisions made regarding the design and construction of 
the Macondo well, efforts to plug it, and actions that could have averted a 
blowout. 
Part III then provides a primer on degrees of negligence, discussing 
the troubled origins of the concept, tracing its problematic development, and 
critiquing existing theories courts have used to explain a doctrine that re-
mains largely in a state of disarray. 
As an alternative to the contorted existing definitions for advanced de-
grees of fault, Part IV offers a novel, criteria-guided analytical framework 
for determining whether misconduct rises to the level of gross negligence or 
willful misconduct. The selected criteria are derived from the doctrinal re-
gimes of punitive damages, strict liability, and comparative fault which 
serve the same punitive, deterrent, and reparative functions as do the terms 
gross negligence and willful misconduct. 15 These interpretative criteria are 
then cast in a two-tiered, multi-factor balancing test that provides analytical 
clarity and precision in applying the terms gross negligence and willful mis-
conduct. 
In an effort to put theory to practice, Part V then illustrates how the 
proposed criteria for gross negligence and willful misconduct could be ap-
plied against some of the alleged acts of negligence in the BP case. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE TO THE BP LITIGATION 
AND BEYOND 
The BP litigation is an amalgamation of hundreds of class actions and 
individual suits brought by diverse categories of plaintiffs claiming econom-
ic losses due to the Gulf oil spill. The claimants include, among others, 
commercial fisherman, charter boat operators, seafood harvesters, oyster 
bed owners, restaurant owners, real estate owners, rental property owners, 
and other Gulf coast business owners. 16 In separate lawsuits, the United 
States, the Gulf states, and local governments impacted by the spill have 
also asserted claims for oil spill clean-up costs, civil penalties, and damages 
15. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
16. Stephen Gidiere, Mike Freeman & Mary Samuels, The Coming Wave of Gulf 
Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 374, 379 (2010). 
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under various federal and state environmental statutes. 17 In addition to BP, 
the other principal defendants are Anadarko Exploration & Production LP 
(Anadarko) and MOEX Offshore 2007 LLC (MOEX), BP's business part-
ners and co-owners of the Macondo well, 18 and Transocean Holdings LLC 
(Transocean), the owner, either directly or through subsidiaries, of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig (collectively BP defendants). 19 The U.S. Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has consolidated the litigation in the East-
em District of Louisiana. 20 
A. Federal Environmental Statutory Claims 
There are two federal environmental statutes that will figure promi-
nently in BP's liability for the oil spill. Each of these statutes provides for 
substantially augmented damages and penalties if the harm was caused by 
gross negligence or willful misconduct. This Section provides a brief over-
view of the applicable environmental statutory claims and the critical im-
pact the terms gross negligence and willful misconduct may have on their 
outcome. 
I. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
The chief compensatory vehicle through which the BP litigation plain-
tiffs, both private and public, will recover for economic loss and clean-up 
costs is the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).21 The OPA provides for re-
covery of a wide array of damages and costs by both private citizens and 
governmental entities.22 As explained below, the ultimate amount of the 
17. !d. at 376-78 (discussing the various statutory bases for these governmental 
claims). 
18. ADAM B. COHEN, F. HOLT GODDARD & BLAINE G. LECESNE, BP & ANADARKO: 
NEGLIGENCE ARGUMENTS, COVENANT REVIEW I (2010). 
19. Several other subcontractors have been named as defendants in the class actions. 
Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 16, at 379. The most noteworthy of these are Halli-
burton, the company that did the cementing work involved in capping the Macondo well, and 
Cameron International (Cameron), the company that supplied the malfunctioning blowout 
preventer valves that failed to stop the spill. See id. 
20. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 
947 (E.D. La. 2011) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to dis-
miss). 
21. 33 U.S. C. §§ 270 l-2762 (2006). 
22. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006) ("Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of 
law, and subject to the provisions of this Act, each responsible party for a vessel or a facility 
from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into 
or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable 
for the removal costs and damages ... that result from such incident."). OPA's liability re-
. gime also provides strict joint and several liability for responsible parties. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 
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damages and costs that the responsible parties may be compelled to pay will 
depend on the degree of negligence assigned to their conduct. The cumula-
tive tally under the OPA's broadly worded damages provision will be enor-
mous by any measure. 
Under the OPA, the United States, individual states, and Indian tribes 
may recover all costs associated with the containment, mitigation, and re-
moval of spilled oiJ.23 BP, as permittee of the Macondo well drill area where 
the spill occurred, and Transocean, as owner of the vessel (the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig) from which the oil was discharged, have been deemed the 
"responsible part[ies ]" under the OP A. 24 
These same public entities may also recover damages for harm caused 
to, "or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable costs of 
assessing" any such damage.25 Still further, governmental entities, including 
local governments, can recover revenues lost from such sources as taxes, 
royalties, rents, and fees resulting from damage to real or personal property 
or natural resources, 26 as well as costs for providing increased or additional 
public services during or after removal activities.27 
(2006). Therefore, liability may be based simply on one's status as owner or operator of a 
vessel and does not require either direct involvement or control. 
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(31), 2702(b)(I)(A) (2006). 
24. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(C) (2006). Responsible parties include the owner or op-
erator of a vessel. § 2701(32)(A) (2006). The Deepwater Horizon was a semisubmersible 
mobile offshore drilling rig, qualifying it as a "vessel" and thus its owner, Transocean, as a 
responsible party under this section. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE DEEPWATER HORIZON SPILL 4 (2010), available at 
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream!handle/1/4595438/Report%20on%20Economic%20Loss% 
20Liability%2011%2022%20JO.pdf. This section of the Act also defines the responsible 
party of an offshore facility as the Jessee or permittee of the area in which the facility is 
located. !d. at 7 (citing§ 2701(32)(C)). As permittee of the Macondo well area, and operator 
and lessee of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, BP was designated, by the United States Coast 
Guard, as a responsible party under OP A and has accepted that designation. See id. at II n.33 
(citing Letter from James H. Dupree, President, BP Exploration and Production Inc., to 
Thomas Morrison, Chief, Claims Division, U.S. Coast Guard (May 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscg.miVfoia/docs/DWH/2094.pdf). 
25. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
26. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D) (2006); see Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 
16, at 375. Taken together, these broadly phrased provisions, allowing damages for loss of 
use and loss of revenue due to property or natural resource damage, are sufficiently expan-
sive to support an argument that lost revenue of the moratorium precipitated by the oil spill 
are recoverable under OPA. Indeed, in denying defendants' motion to dismiss moratorium 
· claims, the court in the BP litigation has ruled that the moratorium claimants have plausibly 
alleged claims under the OPA. See also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," 
808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962 (E. D. La. 2011) (order granting in part and denying in part defend-
ants' motion to dismiss). 
27. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(F) (2006); see Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 
16, at 376. 
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The OPA also grants a private cause of action to owners or lessees of 
real or personal property to recover damages or economic losses resulting 
from the destruction or injury to such property.28 The OPA imposes strict 
liability under its damages provisions.29 Consequently, liability attaches 
without regard to the reasonableness or blameworthiness of the responsible 
party's conduct. Liability is subject to a monetary cap of $75,000,000 for 
each incident by each responsible party.30 This liability cap, however, is 
subject to a critical exception at issue in the BP litigation. There is no limit 
to liability if the damage was proximately caused by "gross negligence or 
willful misconduct. "31 
The investigative findings to date leave little doubt that negligence 
was the root cause of the explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
and the subsequent oil spillY The degree of that negligent conduct, howev-
er, is yet to be determined, and that very determination is at the epicenter of 
BP's liability under the OPA and beyond. 
2. The Clean Water Act 
Another environmental statute under which the BP defendants' liabil-
ity is seriously impacted by a finding of gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct is the Clean Water Act (CWA)Y The CWA imposes civil penalties on 
the owner or operator of any vessel or facility that discharges oil into na-
tional waters. 34 The penalty for such discharges is up to $11 00 per barrel of 
28. 33 U.S. C. § 2702(2)(B) (2006). 
29. GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 8; Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra 16, at 375. 
30. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). 
31. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(l)(A) (2006). This exception negating the cap also extends 
to any "person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party." § 
2704(c)(l)(B). Thus, BP's minority partners, Anadarko and MOEX, may be liable for their 
proportionate share of unlimited liability in accordance with their joint venture agreement. 
For these defendants, which are much smaller companies than BP, having to bear their share 
of unlimited damages under the OPA could bankrupt them. 
32. Some observers have even suggested that, at minimum, gross negligence was 
involved in both the precipitating events that caused the explosion and subsequent efforts to 
avert the spill. Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 16, at 376. The specter of gross 
negligence or willful misconduct is also magnified by the U.S. Justice Department's on-
going criminal investigation of the BP oil spill given that such behavior is a predicate for 
criminal liability under certain environmental provisions and other criminal statutes. See 
discussion infra Subsection I.A.2. 
33. 33 u.s.c. § 1251 (2006). 
34. 33 U.S.C. § 132I(b)(7)(A) (2006). The United States has named BP, Anadarko, 
MOEX and Transocean, and its affiliates, as defendants in its Complaint, seeking civil penal-
ties under the CWA. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," 808 F. Supp. 
2d 943, 948 (E.D. La. 2011) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to 
dismiss). 
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oil.35 However, the penalty is up to $4300 per barrel if the discharge was the 
result of "gross negligence or willful misconduct" of the person who caused 
it. 36 Here too a designation by the court that the BP defendants engaged in 
some heightened degree of fault could result in trebled sanctions. 
The difference in liability under the CW A is significant considering 
the volume of oil that spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. According to gov-
ernment estimates, approximately 4.9 million barrels of oil were discharged 
into the Gulf of Mexico.37 Thus, a finding of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct could mean the difference between $5.4 billion and $21.1 bil-
lion in CW A fines alone. Moreover, such a designation under the OPA or 
the CW A could trigger increased liability under federal maritime and state 
common law and statutory tort claims, as discussed in the next section. 
B. State Common Law and Statutory Claims 
While plaintiffs will rely principally upon the OP A to recover the bulk 
of the economic losses incurred as a result of the oil spill, they have also 
asserted a variety of state common law and statutory claims seeking addi-
tional compensatory and punitive damage awards.38 These tort claims, in-
cluding actions for trespass, nuisance, strict liability, and fraudulent con-
cealment, were made based upon a savings clause in the OPA which pro-
vides, in relevant part, that "[ n ]othing in this Act ... shall affect, or be con-
strued or interpreted to affect or modify in any way the obligations or lia-
bilities of any person under ... State law, including common law.m9 This 
savings provision arguably opens the door to a host of state common law 
claims, the resolution of which could also be heavily shaped, either directly 
or indirectly, by the degree of negligence assigned to the BP defendants' 
conduct. As this Article was nearing completion, the district court in the BP 
litigation dismissed all state common law and statutory claims, finding that 
these state law claims were preempted by federal maritime law, notwith-
standing the OPA's savings provisions.40 Nonetheless, for purposes of this 
Article, these state law claims remain relevant for several reasons. First, the 
court's interlocutory order dismissing them on federal preemption grounds 
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 tbl.l (201 0). 
36. 33 U.S. C. § 1321 (b)(7)(D)(2006); 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 tbl.l. 
37. Joel Achenbach & David A. Fahrenthold, Oil Spill Dumped 4.9 Million Barrels 
into Gulf of Mexico, Latest Measure Shows, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 20 I 0, at A I, available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/201 0/08/02/ AR20 I 0080204695 
.html 
38. Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 16, at 378. 
39. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)(2) (2006). 
40. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 954-
58 (E.D. La. 2011) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to dis-
miss). 
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involves an unsettled area of law subject to varying interpretations.41 Thus 
there is the possibility of reversal on appeal. Secondly, plaintiffs have filed 
similar state court claims in various state courts where they are still pend-
ing.42 Thirdly, beyond the BP litigation, there will be future catastrophic 
damage cases where federal law may not preempt the state law claims as-
serted. Consequently, the role degrees of negligence may play in the dispo-
sition of such claims is still instructive for our purposes, regardless of 
whether they play out in the BP multi-district case. Accordingly, the state 
law claims are discussed below for illustrative purposes notwithstanding 
their interim, interlocutory dismissal in the BP litigation. 
As explained below, several of these tort claims allow for the award of 
punitive damages, which are recoverable when the defendant has engaged in 
grossly negligent or willful misconduct. In addition, such a finding could 
materially affect the percentage of causal fault assigned to each of the BP 
defendants under comparative law principles. 
1. Punitive Awards 
There are several potential bases for an award of punitive damages in 
the BP litigation. First, federal maritime law may permit recovery of puni-
tive damages, which would be in addition to any compensatory damages, 
including damages for economic loss, recovered from other sources such as 
the OPA.43 Secondly, the laws of several Gulf states impacted by the spill 
allow for recovery of punitive damages on state common law causes of ac-
tion.44 Thirdly, there are state environmental counterparts to the OPA and 
the CW A that also use aggravated forms of negligence as liability triggers 
for the award of punitive damages.45 
Punitive damages are awarded to deter and punish wrongful conduct 
beyond that of ordinary negligence.46 In order to recover punitive damages, 
plaintiff must prove not only fault on the part of defendant but some height-
ened degree of fault, such as gross negligence, wanton, willful, or intention-
41. There is conflicting case law on whether the state law claims brought in the BP 
litigation are preempted by maritime law under the facts of this case. See id. at 954-61. For a 
full discussion of the court's preemption rationale in the BP litigation, see id. 
42. !d. at 964. 
43. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488-89 (2008); see Thomas C. 
Galligan, Jr., Death at Sea: A Sad Tale of Disaster, Injustice, and Unnecessary Risk, 71 LA. 
L. REV. 787, 814 (2011); see also Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 16, at 376. 
44. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 2003); MISS. 
CODE ANN.§ 11-1-65(1)(a) (Lexis Supp. 2011); ALA. CODE§ 6-11-20(a) (1987); FLA. STAT. 
ANN.§ 768.72 (West 2011). 
45. See Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 16, at 378 (discussing the Alabama 
Water Pollution Control Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-22-1 to -22-14, 22-22-9(n) (1982)). 
46. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.2.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 
(West Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 11-l-65(1)(a). 
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al misconduct.47 Some of the state statutes implicated in the BP litigation 
explicitly permit punitive damages upon a showing of gross negligence or 
willful or wanton misconduct by defendant.48 Thus, once again, a finding of 
some advanced degree of carelessness by the BP defendants could lead to 
liability well beyond the already massive compensatory damages likely to 
be awarded.49 
A finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct could also influ-
ence the outcomes under those punitive damage statutory schemes that do 
not expressly require such a finding. Among the factors courts look to in 
determining the propriety of a punitive award is '"the degree of reprehensi-
bility of the defendant's conduct. "'50 While this term is broad, encompass-
ing a wide range of morally repugnant behavior, courts have found the more 
culpable state of mind associated with gross negligence sufficient to reach 
the reprehensibility threshold.51 Other punitive damages factors, which co-
incide with the characteristics of gross negligence and willful misconduct, 
include the magnitude of the harm52 and defendant's consciousness of and 
indifference to the risk involved. 53 
2. Comparative Fault Assessments 
The court will eventually make a determination of the relative degree 
to which the conduct of each defendant contributed to plaintiffs' harm. In 
apportioning fault amongst the defendants, the court will likely rely upon 
the guiding principles of comparative fault. 54 Degrees of negligence may 
also be implicated in the court's comparative fault analysis even though 




See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.2. 
See, e.g., TEX. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 41.003; MISS. CODE ANN. § II-
49. There is some uncertainty over whether punitive damages under federal mari-
time law, if awarded, would be subject to the caps imposed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008) (imposing a 1:1 ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages); see also Gidiere, Freeman & Samuels, supra note 16, at 
376-77 (citing the Supreme Court's discussion of single-digit ratio multipliers for state law 
punitive awards in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 
425 (2003)). 
50. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting BMW ofN. Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1995)). 
51. See id. (stating that one of the factors courts should use to determine the degree 
of reprehensibility was the defendant's indifference towards the safety of others, which is 
also a key determinant of gross negligence and willful misconduct). 
52. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.2. 
53. See, e.g., Mobile Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1998); 
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10,23 (Tex. 1994). 
54. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 352. 
55. Id. 
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tive fault, the court apportions fault, usually expressed in terms of percent-
ages, to all tortfeasors whose negligence causally contributed to plaintiff's 
harm, including the plaintiff's own contributory neg1igence.56 The type or 
degree of negligent conduct, however, is largely irrelevant to the causal 
relationship it bears to plaintiff's injury.57 The percentages reflect the degree 
to which the tortfeasor's behavior caused the harm rather than a comparison 
of the relative gradation of defendant's negligence.58 Put another way, com-
parative fault assesses the causal relationship between defendant's conduct 
and plaintiffs' harm, whereas gross negligence and willful misconduct de-
terminations evaluate the state of mind and relative blameworthiness of 
defendants' conduct. 59 
Notwithstanding these conceptual and functional distinctions, the de-
gree of negligence assigned to BP' s conduct could, at least indirectly, influ-
ence the apportionment of fault. Gross negligence and willful misconduct 
share certain salient features that are also primary to the comparative fault 
analysis. Most courts agree that these heightened forms of carelessness re-
quire more than the momentary inattention, lack of circumspection, or inad-
vertence characteristic of ordinary negligence. 60 Some awareness of the po-
tential harm is a necessary predicate for applying these elevated degrees of 
fault. Likewise, cognizance of the danger is also a major factor in determin-
ing how to apportion the blame amongst multiple tortfeasors in the compar-
ative fault analysis.61 An actor found to have been subjectively aware of the 
harm that eventually manifested is more likely to be deemed grossly negli-
gent or willful and to be attributed a higher proportionate share of the fault 
because of that awareness. 62 
Another common denominator is the dispositive role that the magni-
tude of the potential harm plays in findings of gross negligence and willful 
misconduct and in the allocation of comparative fault. Activities that pose 
greater danger, like deep-water drilling, require a higher degree of care 
commensurate with the risk.63 Degrees of negligence (i.e., degrees of fault) 
correspond to the higher degrees of care demanded of high-risk activities.64 
Likewise, the magnitude of the potential risk created by defend(!nts' con-
duct, including the number of persons placed at risk of potential serious 
56. !d. 
57. !d. 
58. !d. at 508-09. 
59. !d. 
60. See discussion infra Part IV. 
61. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT§ 2 (amended 1979), 12 U.L.A. 137 (1977) 
(Commissioners' Comment). 
62. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 212-13. 
63. !d. at 208. 
64. !d. at 209. 
Re-examining Degrees of Negligence 115 
injury, is also a major consideration in the comparative apportionment of 
fault. 65 
The degree of fault assigned to a defendant's conduct is not, at least 
conceptually, the same thing as the degree to which that behavior actually 
caused plaintiffs harm. Nonetheless, in apportioning causal fault, the trier 
of fact on a visceral level is more apt to assign a higher proportion of fault, 
causally speaking, to the more culpable behavior of a grossly negligent de-
fendant than an ordinarily negligent one. 
C. Contractual Allocation of Fault 
The level of fault assigned to BP's conduct could also be a key deter-
minant of BP's private contractual obligations to its business partners with 
whom it shared ownership of the Macondo oil well, where the spill oc-
curred. Contractual provisions that distribute losses between the parties are 
a common feature of commercial agreements between co-adv~nturers and 
joint business enterprises. Typically, losses between co-adventurers are 
shared in proportion to their percentage of ownership interest. Also typical 
of these agreements are exceptions that absolve a party from incurring their 
proportionate share of a loss if that loss was caused by the reckless actions 
of a co-party, in which event the entirety of the loss is absorbed by the of-
fending party.66 Contractual allocations of loss premised upon escalated 
forms of fault such as those at issue in the BP litigation are commonplace 
across a broad range of industries. 67 The operating agreement between BP 
and its partners reflected such loss distribution provisions. Indeed, the 
agreement uses the very terms "gross negligence" and "willful misconduct" 
to apportion losses between the parties. 68 
The Macondo well is jointly owned by BP, Anadarko, and MOEX, 
with respective ownership shares of 65%, 25%, and 10%. Under the terms 
of their standard industry form operating agreement,69 each party bears its 
proportionate share of losses or liabilities except those resulting from a par-
65. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT§ 2 (Commissioners' Comment). 
66. In standard operating agreements, the allocation of loss provisions affected by 
degrees of negligence are usually found in indemnification, distribution of loss, or liability 
clauses within the agreement. 
67. 8 RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:20, at 33 5-43 
(4th ed. 2010). 
68. The Operating Agreement is based upon the Association of American Petroleum 
Landmen Model Form Deepwater Operating Agreement that is standard in the offshore 
drilling industry. See COHEN, GODDARD & LECESNE, supra note 18, at 2. 
69. !d. at 1-2. 
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ty's "gross negligence or willful misconduct,"70 the very same terms which 
trigger liability under the OP A and the CW A. 
The liability implications for BP could be substantiaP1 A finding of 
gross negligence or willful misconduct on its part would result not only in 
the enhanced compensatory and punitive damages outlined above under 
federal and state law, but also in BP having to absorb 100% versus 65% of 
those liabilities. 
The ability to spread the risk of loss and capital investment involved in 
these costly, speculative projects amongst several partners is a major in-
ducement to using the joint venture business model in these types of enter-
prises. The operating agreements governing the parties' relationship take on 
greater urgency when the enterprise is engaged in a high-risk activity that 
carries the potential for great harm, and with it, extraordinary liability. The 
financial incentive to avert losses triggered by heightened degrees of fault in 
private commercial agreements could provide yet another powerful deter-
rent tool if there were particularized criteria to guide their application, co-
extensive with federal and state laws which deploy these same terms to de-
ter careless conduct. Should a predictable standard for aggravated negli-
70. BP, the majority owner, was designated as the "Operator" of the well while the 
minority owners, Anadarko and MOEX, were deemed "non-operating" parties. /d. at I. Sec-
tion 5.2 of the Operating Agreement, titled Workmanlike Conduct, pertains to BP's obliga-
tions and potential liability as Operator of the Macondo well project. /d. at 2. It provides, in 
relevant part, that "[t]he Operator shall not be liable to the non-operating parties for losses 
sustained or liabilities incurred, except as may result from operator's gross negligence or 
willful misconduct." !d. In addition, Article 22, titled Liabilities, Claims and Lawsuits, gov-
erns the parties' respective liabilities for various damages, including those caused by an oil 
spill. /d. at 3. Section 22.5, titled Liability for Damages, provides that each party is liable for 
its proportionate share of damages "except that when liability results from the gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct of a Party, that Party shall be solely responsible for liability 
resulting from its gross negligence or willful misconduct." /d. Still further, Section 22.7, 
titled Damage to Reservoir and Loss of Reserves, provides that no party is liable to another 
for "damage to a reservoir or loss of hydrocarbons, except if that damage or loss arises from 
a Party's gross negligence or willful misconduct." !d. Under this article, BP would also have 
to absorb the entirety of the lost value of the oil spilled, which is estimated to have been 
worth $372 million based on the average weekly price of oil per barrel during the course of 
the spill. See id. at 1-3. 
71. As this Article was being submitted for print, Anadarko settled its contractual 
liability claims with BP, agreeing to pay BP $4 billion to be released from its 25% share of 
the losses from the oil spill. See Julia Werdigier, Ending Dispute, Well Partner Settles with 
BP for $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011, at 87, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/10/ 18/business/bp-recovers-4-billion-from-anadarko-for-gulf-
spill.html. A few months earlier, MOEX paid BP $2.1 billion in a similar settlement regard-
ing its contractual liability for 10% of the oil spill losses. !d. Anadarko's motivation for 
settling with BP was premised on the "uncertainty regarding future liabilities and associated 
risks." !d. Even though Anadarko would have owed nothing under the Operating Agreement 
if BP were found grossly negligent, the lack of clear criteria for determining gross negligence 
likely contributed to the "uncertainty" that prompted the settlement. 
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gence emerge from cases like the BP litigation, it will inevitably manifest in 
contractual provisions allocating losses among co-adventurers in high-risk 
enterprises. Such an outcome could provide joint enterprisers with a sober-
ing financial incentive to minimize risk because the potential losses would 
include not only the already daunting litigation damages and regulatory 
penalties but also the entirety of the company's capital investment and lost 
profits from the venture. 
D. Criminal Liability 
While this Article's focus is on the impact gross negligence and will-
ful misconduct will have on augmented civil liability, it is worth mentioning 
that these terms could determine BP's criminal liability as well. The United 
States Justice Department is considering possible manslaughter charges 
arising out of the deaths of the eleven rig workers killed in the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion.72 Under the applicable federal crimes statute, man-
slaughter is defined as an "unlawful killing of a human being without mal-
ice ... [ w ]ithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States."73 A conviction for involuntary manslaughter may be based upon a 
finding of gross negligence, which is defined as a "wanton or reckless dis-
regard for human life."74 The criminal negligence punishable under this 
statute shares many of the same characteristics of gross negligence, its tort 
law analog, and is viewed as the functional equivalent.75 Consequently, a 
parallel finding of gross negligence in the civil litigation could result in both 
civil and criminal sanctions, further underscoring the significance of a gross 
negligence designation in the BP litigation and invigorating its future deter-
rent value. 
E. Regulatory Implications for Future High-Risk Activities 
Communities are increasingly exposed to large scale potentially cata-
strophic threats posed by profit-driven, high-risk activities, particularly in 
the energy sector. Exceptionally dangerous activities such as deep-water 
72. Justin Blum & Alison Fitzgerald, BP is Said to Face U.S. Review for Man-
slaughter Charges, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
29/bp-managers-said-to-face-u-s-review-f0r-manslaughter-charges.html. 
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (2008). 
74. United States v. Pardee, 368 F.2d 368, 374 (4th Cir. 1966); see also United 
States v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430,438 (D.N.J. 1976). 
75. "Criminal negligence, in fact, corresponds to the concept of 'gross negligence' 
in tort law." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:12 (2007) (Reporter's Comment); see also Martin, 
supra note 13, at 1016 ("[G]ross negligence can be found when an action is bound together 
with a certain state of mind; this is true whether it is in a criminal context or a tort context."); 
see discussion infra Part III. 
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drilling, natural gas exploration, nuclear energy development, and strip coal 
mining will only become more prevalent and escalate the potential magni-
tude and frequency of harm as the unending quest for new and additional 
sources of energy becomes more acute. 76 The need has never been greater 
for effective regulatory mechanisms to ensure that those operations, and the 
new technologies they employ, are conducted with minimal risk. A clarified 
regime of heightened degrees of fault, and their accompanying enhanced 
sanctions, could be a potent deterrent mechanism in the regulatory arsenal. 
The BP litigation will likely generate renewed interest in the meaning 
and application of the terms gross negligence and willful misconduct given 
their potentially monumental impact on damages and penalties in this high-
profile case. It could also shed light on the existing muddled iterations of 
these terms and, hopefully, present an opportunity to both clarify and par-
ticularize the heightened duty owed under these advanced forms of fault. 77 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill presents the perfect storm of circum-
stances against which to assess the efficacy of the regulatory function that 
degrees of negligence can, and, in many legal regimes, were intended to 
serve. At work here is the convergence of a series of acts of a complex, 
technical nature by multiple actors involving multiple, sequential lapses 
during several distinct operational phases of a highly dangerous process. It 
is also how future disasters of this type are likely to unfold. 
In stark contrast, the second largest oil spill in history, the Exxon Val-
dez incident, involved an entirely different factual setting that was unfavor-
able to exposing the existing flawed utility of aggravated negligence as a 
reparative, punitive, and deterrent tool. The Exxon Valdez oil spill was 
caused by an isolated, graphic act of reckless misconduct by an individual.78 
Even the existing tortured definitions of gross negligence were sufficient to 
determine whether the actions of a drunken tanker captain, who left the 
helm of a supertanker carrying fifty-three million gallons of oil moments 
76. New technologies for a controversial method of extracting oil and natural gas 
deposits known as "fracking" have recently been developed. See Allison Good, New Possi-
bilities Are Opening for Louisiana's Energy Industry, Economist Says, NOLA. COM (Aug. 20, 
2011 ), http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/20 11/08/new _possibilities _are_ opening.html. 
Energy industry observers predict that fracking oil shale deposits will open up a "[new] 
frontier" similar to that recently experienced in fracking gas shale deposits. /d. 
77. Of course, it is also possible that none of the issues regarding degrees of negli-
gence will ever be decided in the BP litigation. BP could reach a global settlement of all 
damages including liability for fines, damages, and other penalties, thus avoiding any desig-
nation of the degree of its alleged negligence. See Jane Wardell, BP Reaches $1 B Settlement 
with Gulf Well Partner over Oil Disaster, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2011, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 11/05/20/bps-1 b-settlement-with-gulf-well_ n _ 864644. 
htrnl. 
78. See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
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before negotiating a dangerous tum, exceeded the boundaries of ordinary 
negligence.79 
Also significant is the fact that the Exxon Valdez spill occurred prior to 
the enactment of the OPA and, as destructive as it was, caused significantly 
less economic and environmental damage than did the Deepwater Horizon 
event. 8° Consequently, there was no prospect of unlimited liability for gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. While gross negligence did figure in the 
imposition of fines under the CW A and the award of punitive damages un-
der maritime common law, the court had no trouble finding gross negli-
gence under these relatively anomalous circumstances. 81 
Tort law liability has traditionally functioned as an important regulato-
ry adjunct to legislative schemes that seek to regulate similar behavior. The 
prospect of having to compensate the victims of one's negligent conduct 
presumably deters the actor from engaging in unreasonably risky conduct. 
Predictable standards of care in relation to the risks an activity poses enable 
the actor to coordinate and modify his behavior to comport with the re-
quired duty of care, including the heightened duty of care demanded of 
high-impact risks. 
However, more effective deterrents are necessary to combat the ele-
vated risks accompanying the type of profit-driven, high-risk activities im-
plicated in the BP litigation. These endeavors are capital-intensive projects, 
requiring huge capital outlays that exert considerable economic pressures 
from management and shareholders to assure profitability.82 Yet, these are 
also abnormally dangerous activities that demand an uncompromising 
commitment to safety in order to minimize risk. Strategic financial decision 
making often overrides safety protocol in the field, especially when the op-
erator lacks a strong safety culture or regularly disregards safety protocol to 
save costs or time. 83 More reliable criteria for determining gross negligence 
and willful misconduct would enhance the predictability of augmented 
damages, thus increasing their deterrent value. 
In addition, the threat of punitive damages alone may not sufficiently 
incentivize conductors of these high-risk activities, given the United States 
Supreme Court's recent inclination to cap punitive awards. 84 Moreover, 
79. !d. at 476-77. 
80. See LEHNER & DEANS, supra note I, at 89-90. 
81. E=on, 554 U.S. at 512-15. 
82. See BOB CAVNAR, DISASTER ON THE HORIZON: HIGH STAKES, HIGH RISKS, AND 
THE STORY BEHIND THE DEEPWATER WELL BLOWOUT 59 (2010); see a/so COHEN: GODDARD 
& LECESNE, supra note 18, at 5 (footnote omitted). 
83. CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 58; COHEN, GODDARD & LECESNE, supra note 18, at 
5. 
84. See Andrew F. Popper, Capping Incentives, Capping Innovation, Courting Dis-
aster: The Gulf Oil Spill, and Arbitrary Limits on Civil Liability, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 975, 
975, 1005 (2011) ("Caps on something as dangerous as an oil spill seem an obvious mistake. 
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some punitive damages schemes are, in part, based on gross negligence or 
willful misconduct and are impeded by the same linguistic vagaries and 
conceptual fogginess surrounding current use of these terms. 85 
Furthermore, the current lack of clarity diminishes the deterrent value 
of these terms for a number of reasons. The sources of injury-producing 
conduct in high-risk activities such as deep-water drilling can be difficult to 
pinpoint and are likely embedded in a combination of acts. These projects 
are technically complex; they routinely involve multiple actors with over-
lapping input into key aspects of the operations; and the harm is more likely 
to result from a series of acts or systemic behavioral patterns than from a 
singular, episodic event such as what occurred in the Exxon Valdez spill. All 
of this makes the fact-finder's task of grading the level of negligence ex-
ceedingly difficult, especially when measured against a nebulous and ill-
conceived standard.86 The uncertainty surrounding these terms facilitates 
defense strategies by further obfuscating the already blurry lines of distinc-
tion among ordinary negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct. 
It also makes the prospects for augmented liability in the actor's psyche a 
remote abstraction rather than a predictable and proximate risk-management 
consideration. Individual sense of responsibility amongst these multiple 
actors is diminished by the layers of profit-driven participants and multiplic-
ity of tasks, furthering the subliminal disconnect between unreasonable risk 
and increased liability. 
II. A SYNOPSIS OF SOME KEY ALLEGED NEGLIGENT CONDUCT 
The Deepwater Horizon rig explosion was not precipitated by a single 
episode of negligence. Rather, it was the culmination of a series of deci-
sions, acts, and omissions that occurred over the course of many months. 87 
Flawed decision-making, much of it allegedly driven by cost or time-saving 
considerations, permeated key aspects of the Macondo well's operation, 
including its ill-fated design, faulty construction, and careless monitoring of 
its stability.88 The investigative findings to date point to a number of acts as 
potential contributing factors in the rig explosion, including: the decision to 
In fact, caps in most instances have been demonstrated to be a bad idea. They do nothing for 
consumers and create disincentives for safer and more efficient goods. It is simply an illusion 
that they improve the marketplace for goods and services or enhance public safety. The con-
sequences of limiting liability can be devastating and deadly. While the data is not yet con-
clusive, a strong case can be made that a lack of due care, made more likely by capped liabil-
ity and a I: I compensatory to punitive damage ratio, affected the choices made by BP lead-
ing to the Deepwater Horizon disaster."). 
85. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 212. 
86. !d. at 210. 
87. See COHEN, GODDARD & LECESNE, supra note 18, at 5. 
88. !d. 
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use one long, continuous string of casing rather than the industry standard 
series of interlocking liners which would have provided redundant barriers 
to hydrocarbons escaping around the outside of casing;89 the use of six cen-
tralizers in constructing the well instead of the twenty-one urged by Halli-
burton, the subcontractor responsible for cementing the well to seal it;90 the 
premature replacement of "drilling mud," a dense, heavy substance, with the 
much lighter seawater, against the recommendation of subcontractors;91 
disregarding lab test results indicating that the cement slurry used to seal the 
well was unstable;92 choosing to forego a critical test used to determine the 
quality of the cementing work, even though the subcontractor that would 
have conducted the test was already on site;93 disregarding the danger sig-
naled by frequent "kicks" of hydrocarbons surging from the well;94 and ig-
noring poor results from a "negative-pressure test" indicating the well was 
not properly cemented.95 
It was the cumulative effect of these and numerous other decisions, 
acts, and omissions that allegedly contributed to the blowout, either directly 
or indirectly. And it is within this complex, highly technical, factual context 
that the trier of fact will have to determine the degree of negligence in-
volved and apportion fault amongst several possibly concurrent tortfeasors. 
III. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE: A PRIMER 
The notion of separating negligence into ascending and descending 
degrees of care is a departure from negligence orthodoxy. According to 
traditional negligence doctrine, negligence occurs when an actor fails to 
89. See id.; see also CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 169. The author opines that BP's 
decision to run one long string of casing from the bottom of the well all the way to the well 
head was "one of its worst errors-an error that likely played ,a key role in the blowout." /d. 
at 26; see also OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 115 (finding that the decision 
to use the long-string design "should have led BP and Halliburton to be on heightened alert 
for any signs of primary cement failure"). But cf BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT REGARDING THE CAUSES OF THE APRIL 20, 2010 
MACONDO WELL BLOWOUT 38 (2011) (hereinafter BOEMRE REPORT] (concluding that the 
decision to not use liners was made to save costs, but ultimately finding no evidence that the 
long-string casing design was a cause of the blowout). 
90. See COHEN, GODDARD & LECESNE, supra note 18, at 5; CAVNAR, supra note 82, 
at 27; OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 104-05. But cf BOEMRE REPORT, 
supra note 89, at 49 (finding no evidence that the use of six versus twenty-one centralizers 
was a cause of the blowout). 
9\. See COHEN, GODDARD & LECESNE, supra note 18, at 5; OIL SPILL COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 289, at 119-20. 
92. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 117. 
93. /d.atll8-19. 
94. /d. at 120-21. 
95. !d. at 105-08. 
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exercise reasonable care, causing damage to another's person or property.96 
The most frequently used standard of care is that which a reasonably pru-
dent person would be expected to use under the circumstances.97 The level 
of care one would be expected to exercise in a given situation would depend 
upon the gravity of the risk encountered. Under the reasonable person 
standard, the greater the potential harm posed by the risk, the greater the 
caution the actor is required to use to avert it.98 
As explained below, a substantial number of courts and legislatures 
over the last century developed the idea that negligent conduct could be 
cabined into distinct "degrees" of legal fault, with corresponding required 
"degrees" of care.99 Negligence was separated into categories of ordinary, 
gross, and willful misconduct. 100 However, courts encountered significant 
difficulties in defining the mandated degrees of care, the boundaries separat-
ing them, and how, and under what circumstances, they should be applied. 101 
The result is a labyrinth of jurisprudence rife with inconsistencies, contra-
dictions, and obscurity. Degrees of negligence lack a coherent doctrine and 
specific criteria to guide courts in their application. Today, courts are no 
closer to resolving this conundrum than they have been during the last cen-
tury.Io2 
A. Origins and Development of the Concept 
The division of negligence into three degrees can be traced to Roman 
law, which distinguished standards of care into gross, ordinary, and slight 
negligence. 103 This tripartite division of care was later adopted at common 
law in bailment cases during the early eighteenth century. 104 "[S]light negli-
gence [was] failure to use great care; ordinary negligence . . . [was] failure 
to use ordinary care; and gross negligence . . . [was] failure to use even 
slight care."105 In bailment cases, a gratuitous bailee was only expected to 
96. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 ENG. REP. 490, 492-93 (C.P. 1837) (providing the 
canonical citation for the proposition that negligence is a lack of ordinary care). 
97. ld. at 493. 
98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note I, at 208. 
99. ld. at 209. 
I 00. !d. at 208-I4. 
IOI. /d. 
I 02. Cf Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for Specific 
Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV. 343, 347 (2005) (discussing the similarly incoherent doctrine 
surrounding courts' attempts to distinguish the characteristics of general and specific juris-
diction). 
I 03. Nelson P. Miller, An Ancient Law of Care, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 3 (2004); The 
Three Degrees of Negligence, 8 AM. L. REv. 649, 649 (I874). 
104. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 349 (citing Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. I07 (I703)). 
I 05. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 210 (footnote omitted). 
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exercise slight care and thus would only be liable for gross negligence. 106 
Conversely, if the property was held for the bailee's benefit, extraordinary 
care was required and liability would result for slight negligence. 107 If the 
bailment was for the mutual benefit of both bailor and bailee, liability would 
arise for ordinary negligence. 108 
Beginning in 1907, a small number of courts developed a principle 
holding a driver to a limited standard of care to guest passengers, based 
upon the lower level of care required of a gratuitous bailee. 109 Taking their 
cue from this emerging doctrine, a number of state legislatures enacted "au-
tomobile guest statutes, "which limited the liability of a car driver to gratui-
tous guest passengers to instances of aggravated misconduct. 110 The defini-
tion of misconduct under these guest statutes "varie[ d] from state to state, 
according to the fancy of the legislature."'" The proscribed misconduct in 
some states included "gross negligence" while in others it included "will-
ful," "wanton," or "reckless" misconduct or some combination of these 
terms. 112 The following case captures the disarray that followed. 
In Williamson v. McKenna, the Oregon Supreme Court examined the 
state of gross negligence across multiple jurisdictions in the context of au-
tomobile guest statutes and came to the conclusion that the standard was 
synonymous with recklessness. 113 The court undertook the task of formulat-
ing a usable test that would enable trial judges and juries to determine "with 
reasonable accuracy and consistency" what conduct was sufficiently culpa-
ble enough to satisfy gross negligence. 114 Upon surveying other states' ap-
plications of the gross negligence standard in its attempt to create such a 
test, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that most jurisdictions struggled with 
distinguishing gross negligence from recklessness. 115 The key factor trou-
bling courts appeared to be a determination of the actor's state of mind. 116 
Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington were listed as the states 
that limited recovery to cases of intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless 
106. /d. at n.27. 
107. /d. 
108. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 349. 




113. 354 P.2d. 56, 66 (Or. 1960). 
114. !d. at 59 ("Since we are dealing here with a question of the quantum of fault it is 
obvious that we cannot expect to find a rule or standard that can be applied with any preci-
sion; the most that we can hope for is a clear statement of the factors or elements which must 
characterize the host's conduct in order to permit recovery."). 
115. /d.at62. 
116. /d. 
124 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:103 
misconduct. 117 Courts in Kansas, Michigan, and Florida made the term syn-
onymous with willful a_nd wanton misconduct. 118 
Still, other jurisdictions persisted in distinguishing gross negligence 
and willful or wanton misconduct under their guest statutes. 119 Wyoming 
defined gross negligence as: 
[M]anifestly a smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the cir-
cumstances require of a prudent man. But it falls short of being such reckless dis-
regard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a willful and intentional 
wrong. Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while both 
differ in kind from willful and intentional conduct which is or ought to be known 
to have a tendency to injure. 120 
Massachusetts, on the other hand, attempted to separate gross negligence 
from ordinary negligence in the context of automobile accidents on the basis 
of the number of seconds that the driver is guilty of inattention by compar-
ing them with instances showing longer periods of inattention. 121 
In light of such wildly varying, and sometimes incoherent, interpreta-
tions of gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct and the prag-
matic difficulties in applying these terms, most courts and commentators 
rejected the idea of degrees of negligence as "'vague and impracticable"' 
and lacking a basis in legal principle. 122 Among the critics were Prosser and 
Keeton, who observed that "there is perhaps no other group of statutes 
which have filled the courts with appeals on so many knotty little problems 
involving petty and otherwise entirely inconsequential points of law [such 
as] ... the meaning, and application, of 'gross,' 'willful,' 'wanton,' 'reck-
less,' or whatever other terms the statute may adopt." 123 Another noted tort 
scholar applauded their demise, commenting that "[n]othing was lost in 
leaving the scheme behind because the reasonable prudent person test, with 
its attention to circumstances, was quite adequate to deal with the cases."124 
The miserable failure of the automobile guest statute experiment did 
not, however, dissuade other courts and legislatures from using various 
forms of aggravated negligence to impose greater liability than would be 
applicable for ordinary negligence. 125 The terms gross negligence, willful, 
wanton, and reckless were used prolifically, often in arbitrary combinations, 
117. /d. at 59-60. (Some of these states had already done away with the term "gross 
negligence" (originally included) in their guest statutes.) 
350. 
118. /d. at 60-61. 
119. /d.at62. 
120. Mitchell v. Walters, 100 P.2d 102, 107 (Wyo. 1940). 
121. Dinardi v. Herook, 105 N.E.2d 197, 198 (Mass. 1952). 




KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 216. 
DOBBS, supra note 5, at 350. 
!d. at 349. 
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to distinguish ordinary negligence from more culpable misconduct deserv-
ing of more severe punishment. 126 The amalgamation of these terms only 
furthered the confusion amongst courts interpreting them. 
To fully appreciate the ensuing confusion, which remains to this day, 
it would be helpful to explore briefly what the individual terms gross negli-
gence and willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct are intended, at least the-
oretically, to convey. "Negligence," in its broadest sense, imparts the idea of 
inattention, inadvertence, or lack of circumspection. 127 The difference be-
tween ordinary and gross negligence is considered one of degree. 128 "Will-
fulness," on the other hand, conveys the notion of purpose or design, actual 
or constructive. 129 "Wantonness" and "recklessness" suggest that the actor 
knew or had reason to know of a substantial risk of harm and chose to pro-
ceed in conscious indifference to the safety of others. 130 Willful, wanton, 
and reckless misconduct each entail a mental component that is neither nec-
essary nor appropriate to establish gross negligence131 since negligence is 
conduct, not a state of mind. 132 Hence, the difference between any form of 
negligence and willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct is said to be a matter 
ofkind.133 
Notwithstanding these conceptual distinctions, some courts, dissatis-
fied with degrees of negligence as a matter of law, began to construe gross 
negligence to require willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct. 134 These ju-
risdictions viewed willful, wanton, or reckless actions as indistinguishable, 
conflating all three terms to have the same meaning. 135 In equating gross 
negligence with these forms of quasi-intentional misconduct, gross negli-
gence became suffused with the mental element characteristic of willful, 
wanton, and reckless behavior. Consequently, some courts began requiring 
a conscious indifference to the risk of harm as a prerequisite to a finding of 
gross negligence. 136 
126. Mitchell v. Walters, 100 P.2d 102, 107 (Wyo. 1940) ("Ordinary and gross negli-
gence differ in degree of inattention, while both differ in kind from willful and intentional 
conduct which is or ought to be known to have a tendency to injure."). 
127. 3 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN 
LAW OF TORTS§ 10:7, at 16 (2008). 
128. /d. 
129. !d. at 16-17. 
130. See DeJesus v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 479 F.3d 271,286 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Bloom v. DuBois Reg'! Med. Ctr., 597 A.2d 671,679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)). 
131. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 351. 
132. /d. at 275. 
133. See id. 
134. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 212. 
135. !d. 
136. See generally James B. Brady, Recklessness, Negligence, Indifference and 
Awareness, 43 Moo. L. REV. 381 (1980); Shelden D. Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 91, 143 (1933). Most courts grew dissatisfied with degrees of care as a matter 
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This collapsing of terms has not served to clarify the standards they re-
fer to, as it is contrary to the common understanding of the terms. Most con-
sider "negligence" and "willfulness" or "wantonness" as self-contradictory, 
incongruous terms that are mutually exclusive and which infer radically 
different mental states. 137 Negligence is a mere inadvertence while "willful" 
and "wanton" describe acts that transcend "negligence," no matter how 
"gross."138 Recklessness involves "a clear and present danger" and the 
awareness that the "act or omission ... is likely to result in injury," while 
willful misconduct is likened more to a level of culpability approaching 
intent, almost "a design, purpose, or intent to cause the injury."139 Contrast-
ed with the obscure contours of gross negligence, willful misconduct is a 
more clearly defined standard. Willful misconduct denotes a state of mind 
that "approaches intent to do harm."140 Therefore, willful misconduct can be 
established by demonstrating that an "actor has intentionally committed an 
act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is 
so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow." 141 It is this 
focus on the design or purpose in the actor's state of mind which places 
willful misconduct closer to the intentional conduct end of tlie spectrum, 
while gross negligence is nearer to the ordinary negligence end of that spec-
trum. As articulated by the Fifth Circuit, willful misconduct is a standard of 
deliberate indifference, a '"lesser form of intent,"' while gross negligence is 
a "'heightened degree of negligence. "'142 
of law and began to construe gross negligence to require willful, wanton, or reckless miscon-
duct. See, e.g., Elliott, supra, at 124-35. Mostly, these jurisdictions ascribe willful, wanton, 
or reckless actions as a "penumbera," converging all three words to have the same meaning. 
/d. The distinction hinges on a tortfeasor's consciousness of wrongdoing as to whether there 
was intent to harm or proceed with knowledge that the harm is substantially certain to occur. 
/d. This legal fallacy ignores the very essence of gross negligence and willful misconduct, 
which have distinct purposes in the behavior they were developed to address. 
137. SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 127, § 10:7, at 17-18 n.6 ("[N]egligence 
and willful misconduct are 'mutually exclusive.'" (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 863 P.2d 795, 830 (Cal. 1993))); id. at n. 7 ("Negligence and willfulness are as unmixa-
ble as oil and water[;] '[w]ilful negligence' is as self-contradictory as 'guilty innocence."' 
(quoting Kelly v. Mallot, 135 F. 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1905))); id. at n.8 (citing Anderson v. 
Comm'r,81 F.2d457,460(!0thCir. 1936)). 
138. /d. § I 0:6, at 15 (footnote omitted). 
139. Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Boyce v. Pi 
Kappa Alpha Holding Corp., 476 F.2d 447,453 (5th Cir. 1973). 
140. See 57 A AM. JUR. 2o Negligence§ 261 n.2 (2012) (citing Stofer v. Ramsey, 558 
F. Supp. I, 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1982)); see also Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Wyo. 
1986) ("The aggravating factor which distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary negli-
gence is the actor's state of mind."). 
141. Bryant, 728 P.2d at 1136 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 213). 
142. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 n. 10 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
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Another incongruity resulting from courts construing gross negligence 
under a willful misconduct standard involves the required level of actual or 
constructive prior knowledge of the risk. 143 The level of awareness required 
for willful misconduct is much more specific than what is necessary for 
gross negligence, where it is an awareness of a general, but grave, risk of 
harm. In willful misconduct, the awareness must rise to a level of specificity 
as to the actual harm that resulted, such that it is just short of intentionally 
willing the resulting harm. 144 
Despite such ideational anomalies, courts have clung to the assimila-
tion of gross negligence to willful or reckless misconduct when deploying 
those terms to justify harsher punishment. 145 As a result, the terms are 
viewed by many courts as synonymous, each requiring a mental state evinc-
ing an indifference to the injurious consequences of one's actions thus 
providing the culpable mindset that distinguishes this behavior from ordi-
nary negligence. 146 Williamson offers one possible explanation for their con-
flation in the jurisprudence: 
Faced with the problem of drawing a line between ordinary negligence and inad-
vertent conduct of a more serious nature, but short of conduct evidencing a con-
sciousness of risk and danger, the courts found that the task was impossible be-
cause there was no test or language or factors to guide the courts' hand in marking 
out the division between ordinary and gross negligence on the scale of "ascending 
and descending degrees of care," to borrow a phrase from Jones on Bailments. As a 
matter of the practical administration of justice, it was necessary to move up the 
scale of fault where there could be found a distinguishing feature which could 
serve as a point of division in describing serious culpability and which could be 
used in testing the defendant's conduct in a particular case. That feature was the 
defendant's mental state-the fault that is associated with a consciousness of dan-
ger and an election to encounter it. Gross negligence thus becomes identical with 
recklessness. 147 
Texas has even codified this view in its statutory definition of "gross 
negligence," which states: "Gross negligence means an act or omission ... 
of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but 
nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or 
welfare of others."148 
143. Curtis v. Miss. State Highway Comm'n, 195 So.2d 497, 502 (Miss. 1967); 
Saaybe v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 F. Supp. 65, 69 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Antonace v. Ferri 
Contracting Co., 467 A.2d 833, 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). 
144. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 212. 
145. Negligence, supra note 140, § 261 n.2 (citing Stofer, 558 F. Supp. at 3); see also 
Bryant, 728 P.2d at 1136 ("The aggravating factor which distinguishes willful misconduct 
from ordinary negligence is the actor's state of mind."). 
146. Negligence, supra note 140, § 261 n.2. 
147. Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56,66 (Or. 1960) (citation omitted). 
148. TEX. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 41.001 (II)(West 1997). 
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The Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar view. In Houston Exploration 
Co. v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 149 an oil and gas producer sued for 
damages after the company's gas well blew out due to the defendant's neg-
ligent testing on the well. The court sought to determine whether gross neg-
ligence nullified a contractual right to indemnification between the par-
ties.150 The district court erroneously found the defendant grossly negligent 
without evidence that the defendant was cognizant of the potential conse-
quences of its actions. 151 The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's appli-
cation of gross negligence for failing to adequately consider that defend-
ant's employees lacked knowledge of the risk. 152 Citing Cates v. Beaure-
gard, the court held that gross negligence requires that the negligence of the 
actor be coupled with a conscious awareness of the risk of harm. 153 As a 
result, the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana handling the BP 
litigation will likely require that defendants' negligence be coupled with a 
conscious awareness of the dangers posed by his conduct. 
B. Existing Standards 
"[I may not be able to define it.] But I know it when I see it."154 The 
current contorted definitions of gross negligence and willful misconduct are 
reminiscent of the above observ~tion by Justice Stewart regarding the futili-
ty of defining hard-core pornography. Gross negligence and willful miscon-
duct have morphed into similarly indefmable terms. Iss Due in large part to 
various courts' ill-fated attempts to define them, these terms have become 
so muddled and conflated in the jurisprudence that their foundational quali-
ties have all but disappeared. 156 Their conflation has been compounded by 
modem'statutes (such as the OPA and CWA) that borrowed their common 
law usages without distinction or clarified standards for their application. 
Remarkably, the fragmented manner in which states initially categorized 
gross negligence under guest statutes remains and has arguably worsened. 
149. 269 F.3d 528, 529-30 (5th Cir. 2001). 
150, Id. at 529. 
15 L Id at 532. 
152. Id at 533. 
153. Id at 532 (quoting Cates v. Beauregard E1ec. Coop., Inc., 316 So.2d 907, 916 
(La. Ct. App. 1975)). 
154. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, l, concurring). 
155. See discussion infra Part IV. 
156. Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dept. Ambulance Serv., 639 So. 2d 216,219-20 
(La. 1994) ("[T]here is often no clear distinction between such [willful, wanton or reckless] 
conduct and 'gross negligence,' and the two have tended to merge and take on the same 
meaning." (quoting Falkowski v. Maurus, 637 So. 2d 522,528 (La. Ct. App, 1993))), 
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Presently, and notwithstanding its ubiquitous statutory usage, there is 
no generally accepted meaning of "gross negligence."157 Gross negligence 
has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as "meaning a 
greater want of care than is implied by the term 'ordinary negligence. "'158 
As one court astutely noted, "If the absence of negligence is white and gross 
negligence is black, then innumerable shadings of grey lie between."159 One 
court even dubbed the task of assigning this higher level of culpability as 
akin to entering a legal "twilight zone which exists somewhere between 
ordinary negligence and intentional injury."160 Prosser and Keeton's often 
quoted characterization of gross negligence as a term of "ill-defined con-
tent" succinctly portrays the collective discord. 161 Unfortunately, this dis-
combobulated term will be the fulcrum for determining damages in what 
will likely be the largest mass tort case in history. 
Despite the confusion, there are some formulations of gross negli-
gence and willful misconduct that may prove useful to the court in the BP 
litigation. One of the most widely accepted modem expressions of gross 
negligence suggests that it consists of two components: (1) the view from 
the objective standpoint of the actor and (2) the actual, subjective awareness 
of the risk involved and indifference to the welfare of others. 162 The objec-
tive component evaluates the magnitude and probability of injury; whereas, 
the subjective component considers whether the actor has conscious aware-
ness and indifference. Under the objective element, "extreme risk" means 
that there is a likelihood of serious injury to the plaintiff. 163 The court's fo-
cus on the defendant's state of mind examines whether the actor actually 
knew about the peril and demonstrated that he did not care about its conse-
quences to others. 164 Failure to observe slight care means that the actor is 
careless to a degree that infers indifference to the consequences that may 
result. 165 Inquiry into a corporate actor's state of mind, however, can be 
problematic given the hierarchical structure of the decision-making process. 
The following case is instructive on how such an inquiry may be made. 
In Mobil Oil Corporation v. Ellender, the Texas Supreme Court up-
held a jury verdict for the defendant corporation's failure to take proper 
157. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 212. 
158. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489,495 (1875). 
159. State v. Randol, 597 P.2d 672,677 (Kan. 1979). 
160. Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. 1985); see also Byrd, supra note 
4, at 1383 (quoting id.). 
161. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 10. 
162. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F .3d 305, 
314-27 (5th Cir. 2002) (summarizing Texas law). 
163. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W. 917,921 (Tex. 1998). 
164. Aguirre v. Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d 744,754 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
165. 3 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 127, § 10:16, at 165; see also Mobil Oil Corp.,.968 
S.W.2d at 921; Wai-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322,326 (Tex. 1993). 
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precaution while aware of the likelihood of injury to the plaintiff. 166 The 
court conducted a two-pronged analysis and concluded that there was suffi-
cient evidence to show that the defendant was grossly negligent. 167 First, the 
court evaluated whether the defendant's actions objectively involved an 
extreme degree of risk. 168 The defendant argued that it complied with indus-
try standards for benzene exposure that existed at the time the plaintiff was 
employed; however, the fact that a defendant exercised some care "does not 
insulate the defendant from gross negligence liability."169 The act of expos-
ing an employee to an extreme risk setting without monitoring exposure, 
providing protective gear, or warning of the risks was evidence from which 
a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's acts and omissions in-
volved an extreme degree ofrisk.170 
Next, the court determined whether a vice principal of the defendant 
corporation subjectively knew of the extraordinary risk involved from ben-
zene exposure. 171 In assessing liability the court distinguished between acts 
that are solely attributable to agents and acts that are directly attributable to 
the corporation. 172 A corporation is grossly liable if acts of negligence are 
attributable to a vice principal. 173 Critical to the court's holding was a find-
ing that there was sufficient evidence to show subjective awareness on the 
part of the defendant company. 174 A corporation may be liable in punitive 
damages for gross negligence if the corporation: ( 1) authorizes or ratifies an 
agent's gross negligence and (2) is grossly negligent in hiring an unfit agent 
or commits gross negligence through the actions or inactions of: 
(a) corporate officers; (b) those who have authority to employ, direct, and dis-
charge servants of the master; (c) those engaged in the performance of nondelega-
ble or absolute duties of the master; and (d) those to whom the master has confided 
the management of the whole or a department or a division ofthe business. 175 
The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the de-
fendant vice principals had actual awareness of the risk benzene exposure 
involved but "proceeded with conscious indifference toward the rights, safe-
ty or welfare" of the plaintiff and other workers. 176 Particularly, the testimo-
ny of the defendant's medical director that the company had knowledge of 
the extreme benzene hazards posed at its workplace rendered the mere com-
166. Mobil Oil Corp., 968 S.W.2d at 921. 
167. !d. 
168. !d. 
169. !d. at 924. 
170. !d. at 923-24. 
171. /d. at 924. 
172. Jd. 
173. Jd. at 921-22. 
174. !d. 
175. Jd. (citations omitted). 
176. Id. at 925. 
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pliance with industry standards as insufficient to meet an objective standard 
of a level of care that would "insulate the defendant from gross negligence 
liability."177 Further, to satisfy the subjective component of gross negli-
gence, the court found that the defendant's policy of monitoring and pro-
tecting its own employees but not doing the same for contract workers pro-
vided additional facts and circumstances for the jury to infer that the de-
fendant knew the risks of benzene exposure yet proceeded with conscious 
indifference toward the rights, safety, or welfare of contract workers vis-a-
vis that risk. 178 
Another useful perspective comes from a few courts that have found 
gross negligence based on multiple acts of ordinary negligence. The Fifth 
Circuit recognized that "single acts of ordinary negligence may become 
'elements' that 'collectively constitute[] gross negligence"' and that a "rec-
ord [of] evidence of the defendant's acts of ordinary negligence demonstrat-
ed" conscious indifference to the plaintiff's rights. 179 In Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. Marshall, the plaintiff was claiming mental anguish damages 
resulting from the mishandling of the plaintiff's medical claims resulting 
from a workplace injury. 180 Texas law required a showing of gross negli-
gence to recover mental anguish damages. The Texas appellate court de-
fined gross negligence as an "'entire want of care which would raise the 
belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of a conscious 
indifference to the right or welfare of the person or persons to be affected by 
it. "'181 The court then went further and stated that "[a] defendant's single 
action may be no more than ordinary negligence; however, when considered 
along with other negligent acts, it may become an element of what collec-
tively constitutes gross negligence."182 In Aetna, the court held that Aetna's 
"successive and repetitive acts of negligence, when considered collectively, 
suffice to constitute gross negligence."183 This idea can be traced back to 
177. !d. at 923-24. 
178. !d. at 925 (focusing on the fact that Mobil provided protective gear and instruc-
tions on proper benzene handling to employees but not to contract workers such as the plain-
tiff). 
179. Clements v. Steele, 792 F.2d 515, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 699 S. W.2d 896, 903 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)). 
180. 699 S.W.2d at 903-04. 
181. !d. at 903 (quoting Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 
1981)). 
182. !d. (citing McPhearson v. Sullivan, 463 S.W.2d 174, 175-76 (Tex. 1971)). "Nu-
merous singular acts by Aetna could constitute ordinary negligence when considered alone; 
they may constitute gross negligence when considered together." /d. 
183. /d. at 904. Aetna's acts of negligence included several acts with regard to the 
handling of the plaintiffs file, which when taken together showed a "conscious disregard" to 
the plaintiff's rights, acts such as a failure to maintain correct forms in the file, the ignoring 
of an incorrect unsigned judgment in the file despite the fact that plaintiff's attorneys had 
pointed it out several times, and a lack of diligence in documenting the plaintiffs file, which 
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even the Williamson era, where the Oregon Supreme Court noted that "' [i]t 
is generally agreed ... a combination of negligent acts'" might show "that 
gross negligence has been established."184 
Gross negligence arising from a series of acts can also be found in 
Apache Corp. v. Moore, when an oil well blowout resulted from a combina-
tion of negligent acts on behalf of the defendant corporation,185 and Water 
Quality Insurance Syndicate v. United States. 186 This line of cases is of par-
ticular relevance to the BP litigation because, as previously described, the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion was allegedly precipitated by a series of acts 
and omissions. 
IV. GROSS NEGLIGENCE/WILLFUL MISCONDUCT: A PROPOSED STANDARD 
FOR HIGH-RISK ACTIVITIES 
"A review of the commentaries, scholarly treatises and case law on 
gross negligence shows the term to have universally escaped definition, and 
despite the most assiduous efforts to give it precision it retains its amor-
phous quality," and "the idea remains extremely difficult for the trial courts 
to apply in specific situations."187 
The "unhappy history"188 of aggravated negligence described above 
reveals that courts have been spectacularly unsuccessful in their attempts to 
draw clear distinctions between degrees of negligence. Those failed efforts 
also show that separating negligence arbitrarily189 into three categories was 
unwarranted to begin with and that the definitional results lend little mean-
ingful assistance to the fact-finder in identifying the measure of fault in-
volved. Indeed, current definitions are more apt to confuse rather than en-
lighten the fact-finder. 190 
Some scholars and courts have offered several explanations for this di-
lemma. One view is that negligence is incapable of being sequestered into a 
few standardized modules of varying levels of carelessness because what 
all prevented the plaintiff from being able to see the physician of his choice to seek medical 
treatment. /d. at 903. 
184. Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 72 (Or. 1960) (quoting 2 FOWLER V. 
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 957 (1956)). 
185. See Apache Corp. v. Moore, 891 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), vacated, 517 
U.S. 1217 (1996); see Martin, supra note 13, at 997. The facts of Apache Corp. are discussed 
at length below. See discussion infra Subsection IV.B.2.c. 
186. 632 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D. Mass. 2009); see discussion infra Subsection 
IV.B.2.c. 
187. Nist v. Tudor, 407 P.2d 798,800 (Wash. 1965). 
188. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 211. 
189. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 349. ("It is not easy to believe that there are three and 
only three degrees of fault, since risks imposed by the defendant's conduct range in virtually 
infinite gradations."). 
190. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 210. 
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constitutes heightened fault varies with the myriad circumstances faced by 
the actor whose conduct is being evaluated.'91 As one commentator has not-
ed: 
Certainly the division of all negligence into three degrees has not proved helpful 
and has been generally criticized. The trouble is that it is extremely difficult to use 
effectively. If you say that in one circumstance the defendant is liable for slight 
negligence and in another only for gross negligence, you invite a great deal of 
bootless wrangling over questions that cannot be objectively determined in any 
event. Was the defendant's negligence more than "ordinary"? Was the case one 
that required gross negligence or was it one that required only slight negligence?192 
Others have observed that degrees of negligence serve to fulfill a func-
tion rather than describe a course of behavior, 193 that they are necessarily 
functional rather than descriptive. One scholar explains this theory as fol-
lows: 
A determination of "gross negligence" is to serve a specific purpose or function, 
not merely to describe negligence by an adjective for which another adjective 
could function .... [T]o judge that a party has been "very negligent" is not a very 
good substitute for judging the party as "grossly negligent." ... When we describe 
"gross negligence" or "willful misconduct" as an operative of a formula, we are 
stating its function ... [which] is to control or to justify the imposition of liability 
of a certain sort .... The concept of "gross negligence" developed as a means of 
imposing more severe consequences for a party causing injury than would ensue 
from tort rules applicable to "negligence." The concept of "gross negligence" car-
ries with it, then, a judgment that the conduct of the injury-causing party is more 
blameworthy than "negligence" itself would suggest. 194 
Still others have opined that gross negligence and willful misconduct are 
more terms of art than distinct legal principles. 195 
Rather than adding to the confusion by offering yet another definition 
or attempting to explain it, this Article suggests a way out of the puzzlement 
by proposing a criteria-guided approach that will provide precise, fact-
191. See id. at 209 n.l2 ("One standard of care, that care which a reasonably prudent 
person would use under similar circumstances, is mandated in view of the medley of circum-
stances that may be presented to the trier of fact." (quoting Massey v. Scripter, 258 N.W.2d 
44, 47 (Mich. 1977))). 
192. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 350; see also Martin, supra note 13, at 959 (quoting 
Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. 469,474 (1853), an early admiralty case lamenting 
use of the terms slight, ordinary, and gross negligence whe,rein the court noted that "[i]t may 
be doubted if these terms can be usefully applied in practice. Their meaning is not fixed, or 
capable of being so. One degree, thus described, not only may be confounded with another, 
but it is quite impracticable exactly to distinguish them. Their signification necessarily varies 
according to circumstances, to whose influence the courts have been forced to yield, until 
there are so many real exceptions that the rules themselves can scarcely be said to have a 
general operation."). 
193. Martin, supra note 13, at 973, 975. 
194. !d. at 973, 990-91. 
195. See 3 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 127, § 10:6, at 15. 
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driven guidance to the trier of fact compelled to assess the degree of de-
fendant's negligence. The reasons for such an approach are both principled 
and pragmatic. The criteria are tethered to the compensatory and deterrent 
functions that the terms gross negligence and willful misconduct were in-
tended to serve196 as well as to the policies they were designed to promote. 
Negligence determinations of any variety are highly fact-intensive ex-
ercises.197 Assessing degrees of negligence is a question of fact for the fact-
finder to resolve. 198 The utilitarian advantage of a criteria-guided approach 
to advanced degrees of fault is its flexibility in adjusting to the varying cir-
cumstances confronted by the fact-finder who is being asked to make a rela-
tive judgment. The criteria provide signposts that are probative, though not 
necessarily determinative, of the behavior. A criteria-guided framework also 
facilitates this function by prompting fact-specific inquiry and demanding 
fact-driven conclusions. It also reflects the fact-centric nature of any negli-
gence analysis, consistent with the prevailing rule that "in most situations .. 
. there are no 'degrees' of care or negligence, as a matter of law; there are 
only different amounts of care, as a matter of fact." 199 
There are also a number of practical reasons to resist a definition-
oriented solution. For one, the existing formulations are too knotty and 
comingled to unravel with simply another definition. Courts are unlikely to 
redefine their way out of this thicket of conflicting and conflated definitions 
for labels that have come to mean the same thing. Definitions of gross neg-
ligence and willful misconduct have melded together to the point where 
many courts and legislatures view them as interchangeable labels to de-
scribe the same threshold of culpability, which would warrant more severe 
penalties than ordinary negligence. Furthermore, the definitional paradigm 
is so entrenched in the jurisprudence that yet another definition, however 
illuminating, is unlikely to shift attention from the familiar descriptive for-
mulas to which courts so stubbornly cling, despite their incoherence and 
lack of utility. In short, they are beyond definitional salvation. 
The criteria-guided approach proposed in this Article is akin to the 
"cluster of ideas" interpretative methodology frequently used by the Su-
preme Court when deciphering the meaning of common law terms of art 
used in federal statutes.200 In Morissette v. United States, the Court ex-
plained this technique as follows: 
196. See Martin, supra note 13, at 974. 
197. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 193-208. 
198. 3 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 127, § 10:18, at 41. 
199. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 211. 
200. Martin, supra note 13, at 987 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
263 (1952) (determining whether a criminal statute that did not include the term "intent" 
meant to exclude that requirement as an element of the crimes listed in the statute)); see also 
id. (citing Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301 (1992) (interpreting the application of a 
punitive damages provision in a federal statute)). 
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[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradi-
tion and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the clus-
ter of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from 
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless 
otherwise instructed. In such cases, absence of contrary direction may be taken as 
satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.201 
135 
In determining gross negligence and willful misconduct under the 
OPA and the CWA, the court handling the BP litigation could very well 
resort to the Morissette "cluster of ideas" approach, as some have predict-
ed.202 However, the mere randomized reference to the common law's "wide-
ly accepted definitions" of these terms would afford the court scant interpre-
tative assistance since the definitions themselves, as illustrated above, are 
hopelessly conjoined and mired in uncertainty.203 Without more, the court 
may find that the "cluster of ideas" for these terms is just a morass of clus-
tered ideas. 204 
Therefore, both carefully reasoned and informed selection of the sali-
ent features205 of gross negligence and willful misconduct and a structured 
analytical framework for their application are needed and are what the test 
proposed below endeavors to provide. A significant distinction between the 
"cluster of ideas" technique and the criteria proposed here is that the criteria 
are borrowed not only from the common features of gross negligence and 
willful misconduct found in the cases and statutes using those terms, but 
also from other doctrinal regimes which those terms helped shape and with 
which they share common functions. In addition, the distilled criteria are 
presented in a factor-balancing framework that reflects their relative proba-
tive weight in light of their historical usages by courts and legislatures. 
Because the gross negligence or willful misconduct labels are general-
ly used to serve the functions of punishment and deterrence, it makes sense 
to develop interpretative criteria from policy-related doctrines that serve the 
same or similar functions. Accordingly, the criteria proposed below derive 
from several doctrines whose functions parallel those of aggravated negli-
gence. For example, punitive damages also serve the same dual purpose-
punishment and deterrence-that the terms gross negligence and willful 
misconduct are intended to promote under the OP A and the CW A. In addi-
tion, the statutory and jurisprudential guidelines for the award of punitive 
damages regularly use the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct as a fac-
201. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. 
202. Martin, supra note 13, at 986-87. Professor Martin predicts that the court will 
likely tum to the "cluster of ideas" interpretative technique in applying gross negligence and 
willful misconduct to the facts in the BP litigation. !d. 
203. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. 
204. Martin, supra note 13, at 987. 
205. See id. 
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tor, the same touchstone of gross negligence and willful misconduct so 
prevalent in cases interpreting those terms.206 
Strict liability doctrine is also instructive because statutory schemes 
such as the OP A and the CW A, which use gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct to trigger enhanced liability, are strict liability regimes. 207 That is, 
because the activity involves such a grave risk of harm, liability is imposed 
without regard to fault, thus assuring a compensatory mechanism for those 
harmed by such inherently dangerous activity, even in the absence of negli-
gence. 
Comparative fault principles also provide a fertile doctrinal source for 
the criteria. A key feature that distinguishes ordinary negligence from gross 
negligence or willful misconduct is the moral blameworthiness typically 
associated with these advanced degrees of negligence. The primary reason 
some courts and statutory schemes separate negligence into different cate-
gories is to impose a higher penalty on those engaged in the more culpable 
conduct of gross negligence or willful misconduct. While comparative fault 
serves a different function, focusing on the cause of the harm rather than the 
character of fault, the fact-finder instinctively considers the defendant's 
relative culpability in determining which party should bear the largest pro-
p()rtion of the reparative cost. 
Punitive damages, strict liability, and comparative fault have also been 
reciprocally influenced by certain characteristic features of gross negligence 
and willful misconduct. As will be demonstrated below, the underlying pol-
icies and functions of these related doctrinal regimes and degrees of negli-
gence mutually reinforce one another. Moreover, each of these regimes also 
uses a factor-balancing test to fulfill their respective functions. 
A. Doctrinal Bases 
1. Risk-Utility Analysis 
As mentioned above, several scholars have opined that determining 
whether one's behavior exceeded the boundaries of ordinary negligence, 
and was thus deserving of more severe punishment, could be satisfactorily 
resolved within the familiar construct of what a reasonably prudent person 
would have done under the same or similar circumstances.208 They suggest 
that the objective of imposing a special or higher standard of care in certain 
situations could have been more effectively addressed by adhering to the 
familiar reasonable person under the circumstances used to assess ordinary 
206. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.2. 
207. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 2001); Montauk Oil 
Transp. Corp. v. Tug El Zorro Grande, 54 F.3d Ill, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1995). 
208. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 208-09; DOBBS, supra note 5, at 349-50. 
Re-examining Degrees of Negligence 137 
negligence.209 Under this approach, the hypothetical objectively reasonable 
person, when confronted by an abnormally dangerous risk, would be ex-
pected to exercise increased caution commensurate with the risk. 210 As 
Prosser and Keeton put it: 
The amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable conduct must be in 
proportion to the apparent risk. As the danger becomes greater, the actor is re-
quired to exercise caution commensurate with it. ... Although the [degrees of neg-
ligence] language used by the courts sometimes seems to indicate that a special 
standard is being applied, it would appear that none of these cases should logically 
call for any departure from the usual formula. What is required is merely the con-
duct of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, and 
the greater danger, or the greater responsibility, is merely one of the circumstances, 
demanding only an increased amount of care. 211 
In deciding whether one has conformed to the reasonable prudent per-
son standard, most courts resort to some variant of the risk-utility analysis 
first proposed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co.212 The risk-utility analysis is a factor-balancing approach that requires 
the court to weigh (1) the probability that the harm will occur and (2) the 
gravity of the harm against (3) the costs of avoiding the harm and the utility 
of the actor's conduct.213 Judge Hand proposed this model as an algebraic 
formula that would find an actor negligent if the cost (i.e., burden) of avoid-
ing the harm (B) was less than the probability of the harm occurring (P) 
times the magnitude of the harm should it occur (L ). 214 The burden of avoid-
ing the harm includes not only the direct costs of implementing the safer 
alternative, but also the loss incurred by others or society at large resulting 
from averting the risk.215 Mathematically speaking, negligence liability 
would ensue ifB<PxL. 
Some courts rigidly adhere to this formulaic approach.216 Many courts, 
however, use a less structured version that involves a loose weighing of the 
factors. 217 For those proponents of the structured Hand model, a tempting 
solution to the degrees of negligence conundrum would be to simply cali-
brate the formula to require a higher numerical differential for acts of gross 
209. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 209; see also DOBBS, supra note 5, at 350. 
210. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 349. 
211. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 208-09 (footnotes omitted). 
212. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
213. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 337. 
214. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. 
215. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 341. This component of the cost of avoidance is some-
times referred to as the social utility value of defendant's conduct. 
216. See id. at 340-43. 
217. Seeid.at337-40. 
138 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:103 
negligence or willful misconduct than that which would be needed for ordi-
nary negligence. 218 
While intuitively appealing, a formulaic application of the risk-utility 
test has significant shortcomings as a diagnostic tool for degrees of negli-
gence in scenarios like the Deepwater Horizon event. The main problem is 
quantification of the risk utility factors. Hand's formula does not require 
mathematical proof and, in most cases, "the formula is applied to rough 
estimates derived from practical everyday evidence.11219 However, establish-
ing defendant's negligence still requires plaintiff to offer supporting proof 
probative of the factors. 220 In a case like the BP litigation, adducing such 
evidence, even as a rough, generalized estimate, would be exceedingly dif-
ficult and, even more troubling, could produce a skewed result. For exam-
ple, with respect to the probability of harm factor, probabilities are usually 
expressed in terms of odds or percentages that reflect the average number of 
occurrences over a given span of time. 221 Prior to the Deepwater Horizon 
incident, there had not been a deep-water blowout in the Gulf of Mexico 
since 1969.222 Expressed in terms of percentages, or the odds that such an 
event could occur in 2010, the probability of harm factor would be so low 
that even when multiplied by the exceptional gravity of potential harm it 
would compromise the reasonableness calculus. 
To compound the problem, there are also considerable difficulties with 
roughly quantifying the magnitude of the harm factor in this kind of case. 
The full scope of the potential threat from an off-shore oil spill is so specu-
lative as to be unknowable. It could be anywhere from a small number of 
gallons, which quickly dissipate at sea, causing no measurable harm, to 
hundreds of millions of gallons that cause unfathomable environmental 
damage to ecosystems, the lasting effects of which might never be known.223 
What numerical value, or even rough estimate, does the fact-finder assign to 
the "L" in Hand's formula when assessing the unknown dimensions or pos-
sibly irreversible effects of an oil spill's impact? 
Estimating the costs of avoiding the harm is also an unacceptably 
speculative exercise for the fact-finder applying the Hand formula in these 
kinds of cases. The cost of risk-avoidance (or the "burden" of taking ade-
218. For example, when the ratio of the probability and magnitude of the harm is 
more than three times greater than the cost of prevention, such a differential would warrant a 
finding of gross negligence. 
219. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 345. 
220. Id. 
221. Jd. at 343. 
222. See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627,638 n.ll 
(E.D. La. 2010) (order and reasons granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction). 
223. This example does not even take into account the potential threat to human life 
posed by the oil spill's precipitating event-the well blowout-or the massive economic loss 
caused by the spill. 
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quate precautions, as Judge Hand put it) includes both the direct costs of 
taking alternative measures to avert the harm and the social utility of de-
fendant's conduct. Direct costs, such as the cost of using a more expensive 
casing to line a well or the monetary value of delays required to perform 
additional pressure tests, may be easily measured.224 Quantifying the utility 
of a domestic oil and gas drilling operation is also reasonably measurable.225 
However, a risk assessment process that considers only the value society at 
large places on the utility of the conduct without asking the community 
stakeholders directly affected by a potential catastrophic outcome what 
price they would be willing to pay to avert such a risk is intrinsically 
flawed. 226 As one scholar rhetorically asks: 
What are the reasons for assuming that direct human responses to such a question 
would be less reliable than a method of decision making, such as cost-benefit anal-
ysis[] that uses a stylized definition of catastrophe and studiously avoids address-
ing matters of right and responsibility? What are the reasons for treating cata-
strophic losses indistinguishably from an agglomeration of trivial ones, albeit with 
a slight upward adjustment for some decontextualized notion of risk aversion? 
What justifies the assumption that catastrophic events can be smoothed into con-
tinuous functions within policy models, rather than remain in the form that they 
will actually take, as plunges, spikes, flips, and ruptures?227 
The risk-assessment/cost-benefit analysis paradigm leaves such ques-
tions unanswered, making it ill-suited for evaluating the risk-worthiness of 
uncertain or calamitous threats that are possibly irreversible.228 The destruc-
tion caused by the BP spill, the full dimensions of which are still unknown, 
is illustrative.229 The possibly irreparable environmental damage inflicted by 
the discharge of millions of barrels of toxic crude oil, and equally toxic dis-
persants, at unprecedented ocean depths, the resulting decades of uncertain-
224. However, even with these relatively identifiable direct costs, problems ensue 
when, as in the BP case, there are multiple acts by multiple parties which cumulatively con-
tributed to the harm. Determining the causal contribution of each act and its associated costs 
would be a messy proposition. 
225. For example, an estimated 150,000 jobs are directly related to offshore opera-
tions in the Gulf of Mexico alone. See id. at 632. Gulf oil production accounts for thirty-one 
percent of total domestic oil production and eleven percent of total domestic gas production. 
/d. 
226. See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 95-96 (20 I 0). The author persuasively argues why a cost-
benefit, risk-utility analysis is a "poor decision guide" for low-probability, high-consequence 
environmental threats. ld. at 95. 
227. /d. at 96. 
228. ld. at 95-96. 
229. See Robert R.M. Verchick, In Making Disaster Plans, We Have to Imagine the 
Worst Case, NOLA.COM (Apr. 28,2011,8:37 AM), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/ 
2011/04/we_have_to_imagine.html. 
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ty for commercial fisherman,230 and pemianent closure of Gulf Coast busi-
nesses, some of which were multi-generational, are just a few examples of 
the "costs" rendered irrelevant by an exclusively egalitarian valuation of the 
risk. 
Another problem with a cost-benefit calculus of an exceptionally high 
magnitude risk is that it casts the value of defendant's decision making in 
stark economic terms, devaluing the moral aspect of the actor's choices.231 
As mentioned above, many courts use the risk-utility factors in a far 
more unstructured way, informally weighing the factors to determine the 
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.232 However, even this approach 
has its deficiencies when applied to a BP type case. The factors are simply 
too generalized to adequately inform the fact-finder of whether the thresh-
old of ordinary negligence has been crossed. In addition, an unstructured 
weighing of these factors also suffers from the same prognosticating diffi-
culties and skewed results described above with respect to low probability, 
high-impact events.233 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the risk-utility analysis remains the 
most frequently used framework for determining negligence and would like-
ly suffice in less complex or non-catastrophic cases that call for a finding of 
gross negligence or willful misconduct. It could also satisfactorily resolve 
episodic "know it when you see it" gross negligence scenarios like the Exx-
on-Valdez incident. As such, it is the logical starting point in developing an 
230. See Bob Marshall, Not Another Fish Story, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Oct. 3, 2011, at AI (reporting a university study that found that some species of Gulf fish are 
showing signs of hydrocarbon poisoning, which was a precursor to the collapse of some fish 
and wildlife populations in Alaska after the Exxon Valdez oil spill). 
231. The activity's value to the community, though quite relevant to a determination 
of unreasonableness on a negligence theory, was not included in the proposed test for a cou-
ple of reasons. First, in strict liability applications like the OPA and the CWA, the dangers of 
the activity have already been determined to outweigh the social utility of the activity by 
virtue of its strict liability designation. Secondly, the kinds of activities for which the pro-
posed test has been tailored present such a high degree of risk, that its social utility could not, 
or at least should not, outweigh the costs of the potentially catastrophic harm, even under the 
most rigorous economic cost-benefit analysis. Thirdly, a rigid economic interpretation of 
Hand's risk-utility analysis would undermine the emphasis on safety that the proposed test 
aspires to promote, reducing what should be, at least in part, a morally-based calculation into 
a purely economic one. As some critics of Hand's risk-utility test have complained, it places 
greater value on social utility than it does on consideration of individual justice or moral 
choice, thus making the rights of those injured by the activity subservient to and contingent 
upon what is best for society at large. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 346 (footnote omitted). 
These critics, with whom this writer agrees, "fear that weighing risks and utilities turns 'mor-
al analysis into a bloodless form of calculation' that simply involves plugging in numbers." 
!d. (quoting Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 Soc. PHIL. & POL 'y 52, 80 ( 1999)). 
232. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 337. 
233. See supra text accompanying note 221. 
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alternative analytical framework for degrees of negligence in more factually 
and technically complex cases like the BP litigation. 
In addition, the other doctrinal regimes from which the criteria for the 
proposed test are drawn also rely upon derivatives of one or more of the 
risk-utility factors. Several of the criteria proposed below owe their selec-
tion in some way to the risk-utility factor balancing test. For example, the 
criterion awareness of the danger, which is a more particularized expression 
of the risk-utility's probability of the harm component, is a factor in the 
award of punitive damages and the allocation of comparative fault. Another 
proposed criterion, a high degree of potential harm, which is a variation of 
the risk-utility's magnitude of the harm component, figures prominently in 
the application of strict liability, punitive damages, and comparative fault. 
Another proposed criterion-financially motivated conduct--derives from 
the risk-utility's cost of prevention element and also weighs heavily in puni-
tive damages and comparative fault assessments. Still further, other exam-
ples of the risk-utility analysis' contributions to the test proposed here and 
the doctrinal regimes upon which the proposed test's criteria are based are 
mentioned below. 
2. Punitive Damages 
There is a strong doctrinal kinship between the law of punitive dam-
ages and degrees of negligence. Statutory schemes that deploy terms like 
gross negligence and willful misconduct as a predicate for imposing exem-
plary damages do so to serve the same dual function of punitive damages 
regimes, which is to punish wrongful conduct and deter the wrongdoer and 
others from engaging in similar misconduct.234 Punitive damage schemes, in 
tum, frequently use heightened forms of fault as determining factors in the 
award of punitive damages.235 
The availability of punitive damages on the state level is generally a 
matter of state statutory law. Several states involved in the BP litigation 
authorize the award of punitive damages under certain circumstances, in-
cluding advanced levels of carelessness. For example, Florida permits puni-
tive damages in negligence cases "involving willful, wanton, or gross mis-
234. Some statutes such as the OP A and the CW A serve compensatory and remedial 
functions as well. See John J. Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, I PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW 
& PRAC. 2D § 4 (West 2011). In a few states, including Texas (a plaintiff in the BP litigation), 
punitive damages are also viewed as compensatory in nature. Id. § 4.5. 
235. See TEX. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 41.003 (West 1997); ALA. CODE§ 6-
ll-20(a) (2005); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§§ 09.17.020(b), (c)(l) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 60-3701(b), (c) (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 549.20(\)(b)(\) (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN.§ 411.186(2) (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:\5-5.12(b) (West Supp. 2000); N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§ \D-35 (2011); OR. REV. STAT.§ 30.925(2) (2003). 
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conduct."236 Similarly, a Mississippi plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages 
upon a showing by "clear and convincing evidence that the defendant . . . 
acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wan-
ton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed with actual 
fraud."237 Likewise, Texas authorizes punitive damages upon proofby "clear 
and convincing evidence that the harm" resulted from a willful act or omis-
sion or "gross negl[ect]."238 In Alabama, punitive damages may be awarded 
in tort actions supported by clear and convincing proof that "defendant con-
sciously ... engaged in ... wantonness, or malice with regard to the plain-
tiff.m39 
The reciprocal influence and prevalent interplay between punitive 
damages and degrees of negligence provided instructive doctrinal guidance 
for the criteria proposed below. Several guiding principles consistently 
emerge from state punitive damages statutory schemes. These include: (1) 
the likelihood that serious harm would arise from defendant's misconduct;240 
(2) defendant's awareness of the likelihood of serious harm;241 (3) defend-
ant's indifference to the safety of others;242 and (4) the profitability to de-
fendant from his misconduct. 243 Each of these factors help shape several of 
the criteria used in the proposed framework for degrees of negligence as 
applied to high-risk activities of the type involved in the Deepwater Horizon 
event. 
Some of these same themes are echoed in the jurisprudence evaluating 
punitive damages awards. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the 
United States Supreme Court set forth three "guideposts" for determining 
whether punitive damages awards were excessive.244 One of these guide-
posts is the "reprehensibility" of defendant's misconduct.245 This guidepost 
is of particular relevance because degrees of negligence are often used to 
236. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp. 2011); see also Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. 
v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1357 (Fla. 1994) (quoting id.). 
237. MISS. CODE ANN.§ ll-l-65(1)(a)(West 2011). 
238. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 41.003. 
239. ALA. CODE § 6-ll-20(a). This section also defines "wantonness" as "[c]onduct 
which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." 
/d. 
240. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §09.17.020(c)(l) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3701(b); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41 1.186(2)(a); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 549.20(l)(b)(l); N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 2A:I5-5.12(b); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ ID-35; OR. REV. STAT.§ 30.925(2). 
241. See, e.g., id. 
242. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b)(2) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3701(c); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 549.20(1)(b)(l). 
243. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(c)(3) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3701(b)(3); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41l.l86(2)(c); MINN. STAT. ANN. §549.20(3); N.C. GEN. 
STAT.§ ID-35(2)(h); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 32-03.2-11(5)(c)(2) (2011). 
244. 517 u.s. 559,574-75 (1996). 
245. !d. at 575. 
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describe a culpable state of mind uncharacteristic of ordinary negligence 
and that is also consistent with the notion of reprehensibility. Since the term 
reprehensibility embraces a broad range of morally repugnant behavior, the 
Court provided various indicia of reprehensible conduct to help inform 
courts' decisions on this element.246 One indication of reprehensibility that is 
especially useful for our purposes is indifference to or a reckless disregard 
for the health or safety of others/47 the same guiding factor common to 
many state punitive damages statutes.248 Indifference to the safety of others 
is an integral trait of gross negligence and willful misconduct as well as one 
of the most important factors in awarding punitive damages. For these rea-
sons, it plays an equally prominent role in the test suggested below. 
Another indication of reprehensibility, which lends support to one of 
the proposed criteria, is whether the conduct involved repeated actions or 
was an isolated incident_249 Repeated past behavior consistent with the con-
duct at issue could provide probative insight into either the motivation for 
defendant's conduct or why it may have occurred. The factor used in the 
proposed test that is derived from this concept is whether defendant's con-
duct is consistent with a pattern or practice of disregarding safety. As is the 
case with several of the criteria in the proposed test, it is a particularized 
derivative of an existing principle and the manner of its intended usage will 
be further explained below.250 
Yet another proposed criterion takes its cue from a United States Su-
preme Court decision that reviewed, and ultimately reduced, the punitive 
damages awarded by the lower courts in the Exxon Valdez oil spilP51 In 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether the $2.5 billion awarded under federal maritime tort law was exces-
sive.252 In remitting the punitive award to $500 million, the Court, in an ad-
mittedly narrow ruling, held that punitive damages awarded in this particu-
lar maritime tort case should not exceed the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded.253 Noting that defendant's "tortious action was worse than 
246. !d. at 575-76. 
247. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,419 (2003) (reit-
erating indifference towards the safety of others as an indication of reprehensibility). 
248. See ALASKA STAT.§ 09.17.020(c)(3) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-3701(b)(3); 
KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 411.186(2)(c); MINN. STAT. ANN. §549.20(3); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ ID-
35(2)(h); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 32-03.2-11(5). 
249. !d. North Carolina also uses a comparable factor for determining punitive dam-
ages. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-35(2)(g). "The existence and frequency of any similar past 
conduct" is a punitive damages consideration for the trier. of fact. !d. 
250. See discussion infra Subsection IV.B.2.b. 
251. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008). 
252. /d. at 475-76. The jury's original punitive award of $5 billion against Exxon was 
eventually reduced to $2.5 billion by the Ninth Circuit. /d. at 481. 
253. /d. at 512-14. 
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negligent but less than ma1icious,m54 the Court concluded that punitive 
damages' dual objective of deterrence and punishment was served by a 1:1 
ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages awarded under these 
facts. 255 The Court emphasized, however, that a higher ratio than 1:1 may be 
warran!ed when defendant's conduct evinces a higher degree of moral 
blameworthiness than that involved in this case.256 Significantly, the Court 
pointed out that "strategic financial wrongdoing" was indicative of the more 
culpable behavior that may justify a higher ratio257 and that "[a ]ction taken 
or omitted in order to augment profit represents an enhanced degree of pun-
ishable culpability."258 
Exxon Shipping Co. and state punitive damages schemes that consider 
the financial gain associated with defendant's actions firmly support the 
conclusion that profit-driven conduct amidst high-risk activity is emblemat-
ic of a higher degree of culpable conduct worthy of more severe punishment 
when things go wrong. The proposed criterion of whether defendant's con-
duct was motivated by strategic financial concerns reflects this perspective. 
3. Strict Liability 
The core problem that inspired this Article is society's increasing ex-
posure to continuously escalating levels of potentially catastrophic threats 
associated with high-stakes, high-risk enterprises and the concomitant inef-
fectiveness of current legal regimes to satisfactorily deter unreasonable risk-
taking by these enterprisers. The criteria-guided analytical framework for 
degrees of negligence offered in this Article is specifically intended for use 
in cases involving exceptionally risky activities where the magnitude of the 
potential harm is great. Strict liability doctrine imposes a special form of 
liability for high-risk activities that are so dangerous that significant harm 
may result even if the conductor of that activity exercises the utmost care. 
Liability is imposed even if the harm was not caused by any fault of the 
actor. Presumably, the threat of such strict liability deters risky conduct and 
encourages safer practices amongst those engaged in abnormally dangerous 
activities. 259 As we have seen, statutes like the OP A and the CW A serve a 
similar deterrent purpose by using advanced degrees of negligence to im-
254. !d. at 510. 
255. /d.at513-14. 
256. !d. at 510. 
257. !d. at 510 n.24. The Court cited Alaska's and Florida's punitive damages statutes 
as illustrative. !d. at 510. Both states allow a 3:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
and consider financially motivated misconduct as a factor in awarding punitive damages. See 
Galligan, supra note 43, at 815. 
258. E=on Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 494. 
259. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 964-65. Professor Dobbs cautions that the purported 
deterrent value of strict liability is not free from doubt. I d. at 965. 
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pose augmented damages. Given the relationship between these strict liabil-
ity statutory regimes and the terms gross negligence and willful misconduct, 
particularly when applied in a high-risk context, strict liability principles 
provide yet another insightful doctrinal source of interpretative criteria for 
these terms. 
Towards this end, the First Restatement of Torts is most useful. A 
foundational principle of the First Restatement is that strict liability should 
be imposed on any enterpriser who elects to engage in an activity, regard-
less of its social utility, that exposes the community to an abnormal risk of 
serious harm. 260 The enterpriser should bear the costs of any harm resulting 
from activities that are both abnormally dangerous and uncommon.261 This 
enterprise theory of liability embodied in the First Restatement parallels the 
overarching objectives of degrees of negligence as deterrent and reparative 
devices. 
The drafters of the First Restatement chose the designation "ultra-
hazardous activity" to describe those activities deserving of strict liability 
treatment.262 The two indispensible features of ultra-hazardous activities, 
according to the First Restatement's definition, were that it (1) presented a 
risk of serious harm to persons or property that could not be eliminated even 
with the exercise of utmost care, and (2) was not a matter of common us-
age. 263 Both of these features are considered in the proposed test for gross 
negligence and willful misconduct as applied to high-risk activities. How-
ever, as will be explained below, both characteristics need not be met for a 
finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct in the suggested frame-
work. 
The Second Restatement of Torts is also instructive, though perhaps 
more for its flaws than for its virtues. The Second Restatement displaced the 
term "ultra-hazardous activity" with "abnormally dangerous activities" and 
listed six factors to be considered.264 Those factors are as follows: (a) activi-
ty that presents a high degree of risk of harm; (b) the likelihood that the 
harm will be great; (c) the inability to avoid the risk with reasonable care; 
(d) whether the activity is uncommon; (e) whether the activity is inappropri-
ate to the place where it is conducted; and (f) the extent to which its value to 
the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.265 Factors (a) 
through (d) would militate in favor of a strict liability finding while factors 
(e) and (f) would militate against it. One of the major criticisms of this fac-
tor-balancing approach to strict liability is that it looks more like a "poorly 
260. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 555. 
261. /d. 
262. RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFTORTS § 520 (1938). 
263. /d. 
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 520(a)-(f) (I 977). 
265. !d. 
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disguised negligence regime" balancing the likely prospects for significant 
harm against the value (i.e., social utility) of the defendant's activity to the 
community.266 Prosser and Keeton have also criticized the community value 
factor as relevant to a negligence theory of liability but irrelevant to whether 
the risk of loss from a highly dangerous activity should be allocated to the 
defendant who chooses to engage in that activity.267 Such criticism regarding 
the similarities of the Second Restatement's factor-based approach to a neg-
ligence analysis is actually instructive for our purposes because it reinforces 
the proposition that negligence assessments benefit from the similar factor-
guided approach offered below. 
Another criticism of the Second Restatement formulation is that the 
risk of serious harm and uncommon nature ofthe activity, rather than being 
considered absolute requirements as they were in the First Restatement, are 
each considered merely one of several factors to be weighed such that strict 
liability could be imposed even in their absence. 268 The non-exclusiveness of 
these factors is, of course, what makes them look like a negligence frame-
work, which is actually suitable for our purposes. The kinds of activities for 
which the proposed test is intended to be used are exceptionally dangerous 
and typically would not be viewed as a matter of common usage. Conse-
quently, some, but not all, of them would likely warrant strict liability 
treatment under the Second Restatement. For example, deep-water drilling 
and the production or handling of nuclear materials would likely be deemed 
strict liability activities. On the other hand, some activities, like strip coal 
mining or shallow water drilling, may be considered abnormally dangerous, 
but a court might determine that the dangers are outweighed by other factors 
such as the activity's value to the community/69 the ability to avoid harm 
with reasonable care,270 or finding such activity to be a matter of common 
usage.271 
!d. 
266. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 953. 
267. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 555. The authors further obseJVed: 
When a court applies all of the factors suggested in the Second Restatement it is 
doing virtually the same thing as is done with the negligence concept, except for 
the fact that it is the function of the court to apply the abnormally dangerous con-
cept to the facts as found by the jury. 
268. !d. 
269. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 341. 
270. For example, shallow water drilling occurs in waters less than 500 feet, enabling 
the use of jack-up rigs rather than the floating rigs used in deeper waters. See Hornbeck 
Offshore SeJVs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (E.D. La. 2010). Jack-up rigs 
are considered safer because they allow blowout preventers to be placed on the surface and 
use traditional and proven well control methods. !d. 
271. For example, coal mining in West Virginia and Pennsylvania would be consid-
ered a common activity that is appropriate to the location. 
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Yet all of these activities present a significant enough risk of harm to 
the community that those enterprisers who seek to profit from them should 
be incentivized to minimize the risk regardless of whether a court imposes 
strict liability. While heightened degrees of fault are occasionally used in 
strict liability statutes like the OPA and the CW A, these are still fault-based 
terms and their potential efficacy is not, nor were they intended to be, lim-
ited to strict liability activities.212 Likewise, the objective of the proposed 
test for gross negligence and willful misconduct is to fortify their intended 
deterrent function and thus encourage safer practices regardless of whether 
a court or legislature has anointed the activity to which they are being ap-
plied with strict liability status. For the same reason, this Article also rejects 
the Second Restatement's notion that the communitarian value of the activi-
ty should be a relevant consideration, adopting instead the First Restate-
ment's perspective that enterprisers engaged in these abnormally dangerous 
activities, however socially desirable, should bear the costs of the harm 
those activities cause.273 
The principal criterion in the proposed test that is derived, in part, 
from the strict liability principles discussed above is the existence of a high 
degree of potential harm. In the framework proposed below, both the gravi-
ty of harm and uncommon character of the activity are not considered abso-
lute requirements as they are for strict liability under the First Restatement. 
Nor are they each treated as merely one of several non-exclusive factors for 
strict liability as in the Second Restatement. Rather, only the risk of grave 
harm criterion is considered indispensable to a finding of gross negligence 
or willful misconduct. Whereas, the activity's uncommon character is an 
unstated contingency that only indirectly affects the relative weight of the 
other factors. For example, a finding of uncommon usage increases the pro-
spects for strict liability, which, in turn, heightens the perceived dangerous-
ness of the risk. Accordingly, the degree of potential harm may be magni-
fied. Moreover, the common usage of the activity would only be relevant 
where the activity at issue was not already predetermined to be strict as it is 
under the OP A, the CW A, and other strict liability statutes. 
4. Comparative Fault 
In the BP litigation, the court will at some point apportion fault 
amongst all the BP defendants. In doing so, it will likely have made, or be 
required to make, an ancillary finding of gross negligence or willful mis-
272. For one thing, their usage in strict liability statutes like the OPA and the CWA is 
to determine the level of damages, not whether strict liability should be imposed. Violations 
of these statutes result in strict liability even if caused by no fault of the operator, or, if there 
was fault, regardless of its degree. 
273. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 555. 
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conduct on the part of one or more of the defendants. 274 It remains to be seen 
whether the court's allocation of fault will be influenced by any such ancil-
lary findings regarding the degrees of negligence involved. 
In the classic comparative fault analysis, the fact-finder compares the 
extent to which each party's misconduct, including that of the plaintiff, con-
tributed to plaintiffs harm and then assigns a percentage of fault to that 
conduct.275 Here, the fact-finder is, at least in theory, only concerned with 
the causal relationship between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs harm, 
not the quality of defendant's negligence.276 For example, if defendant A's 
conduct is 90% of the cause of plaintiffs harm and defendant B's conduct is 
10% of the cause of harm, liability will be apportioned between them ac-
cordingly, even if defendant B's negligence was viewed as "gross" and de-
fendant A's negligence was considered "ordinary."277 This seemingly para-
doxical result is consistent with the traditional view of negligence,278 which 
considers an actor's state of mind as immaterial to determining whether he 
was negligent. In describing this axiomatic principle of traditional negli-
gence, one noted treatise author writes: 
A bad state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient to show negligence, and 
conduct is everything. One who drives at a dangerous speed is negligent even if he 
is not aware of his speed and is using his best efforts to drive carefully. Converse-
ly, a person who drives without the slightest care for the safety of others is not neg-
ligent unless he drives in some way that is unreasonably risky. State of mind, in-
cluding knowledge and belief, may motivate or shape conduct, but it is not in itself 
an actionable tort. The legal concept of negligence as unduly risky conduct distinct 
from state of mind reflects the law's strong commitment to an objective standard of 
behavior. 279 
It follows from this conventional negligence perspective that a culpa-
ble mental state should be equally irrelevant to the causal apportionment of 
fault in the comparative fault determination. Conversely, modem compara-
tive fault applications consider the actor's subjective state of mind or rea-
sons behind his conduct as relevant considerations in attributing fault. 280 The 
Uniform Comparative Fault Act endorses this approach by requiring the 
fact-finder to consider "both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault 
274. An ancillary finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct could occur in 
determining the applicability of enhanced damages and penalties under the OPA or the CW A 
or the award of punitive damages under federal maritime law or state statutory law. 
275. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 503-04. 
276. Id. at 352. 
277. See id. 
278. !d. at 508. 
279. !d. at 275 (footnotes omitted). 
280. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY§ 8(a) 
(2000). This section urges consideration of a person's "awareness or indifference with re-
spect to the risks created by the conduct." Id.; see also UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT§ 2, 
12 U.L.A. 135 (1977) (Commissioners' Comment). 
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and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages 
claimed" in determining percentages of fault_281 In comparing fault, the 
drafters of the Act urge the fact-finder to consider a non-exclusive list of 
factors that implicate the actor's state of mind or reasons for his conduct. 
These include: 
(I) [W]hether the conduct was mere inadvertence or engaged in with an awareness 
of the danger involved, (2) the magnitude of the risk created by the conduct, in-
cluding the number of persons endangered and the potential seriousness of the inju-
ry, (3) the significance of what the actor was seeking to attain by his [or her] con-
duct, (4) the actor's superior or inferior capacities, and (5) the particular circum-
stances, such as the existence of an emergency requiring a hasty decision.282 
Louisiana (the locus of the BP litigation) has adopted these same fac-
tors in its comparative fault scheme,283 although neither the drafters of the 
Act nor the courts using them provide any guidance on how they should be 
weighed in calculating percentages of fault. 2R4 Nonetheless, the above fac-
tors fit neatly within the traditional risk-utility framework. Moreover, some 
of them-awareness of the danger, magnitude of the risk, and significance 
of the conduct-replicate factors used in strict liability and punitive damag-
es regimes, all of which further illustrate the cross pollination between the 
risk-utility factors and the doctrinal regimes, including comparative fault, 
from which the proposed test originates. 
Another, more practical, reason why modem comparative fault princi-
ples are instructive is because they reflect the way the human psyche pro-
cesses terms like gross negligence and willful misconduct. These advanced 
forms of careless conduct connote a higher degree of moral turpitude than 
that associated with ordinary negligence. The mind invariably associates the 
moral blameworthiness of defendant's conduct with the cause of plaintiff's 
harm.285 This culpability-causation nexus is made on a visceral level by the 
fact-finder in the comparative allocation of fault. One scholar convincingly 
explains the phenomenon as follows: 
The usage of "gross negligence" and "willful misconduct," or words of similar im-
port, merges together with concepts of causation: the human mind in making such 
a judgment generally requires that to cross that threshold of blameworthiness the 
act constituting the gross negligence and willful misconduct must have been the 
principal reason for the injury. Despite efforts of some writers and courts to sepa-
281. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT§ 2(b); see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ WITH EVELYN 
F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE§ \7.0l[a] (2011). 
282. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2 (Commissioners' Comment); see also 
ARTHUR BEST ET AL., COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 19.10[3][b] (2011). 
283. See Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967, 974 (La. 1985). 
284. BEST ET AL., supra note 282, § 19.10[3][b][i]. 
285. See Martin, supra note 13, at 1027. 
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rate law and liability from concepts of morality, the human mind is evidently de-
signed to make such judgments. 286 
A number of the criteria in the proposed test were derived, in part, 
from the above-referenced comparative fault factors. They include an unu-
sually high degree of potential harm and awareness of the danger, both of 
which were also selected because of their significant roles in punitive dam-
ages doctrine; conduct motivated by strategic financial concerns, which is 
also frequently used in punitive damages assessments and is a derivative of 
the "significance" of the actor's conduct; and the presence of any exigent 
circumstances tending to vitiate the culpability which would otherwise be 
imputed from the actor's behavior.287 
B. A Multi-Factor Balancing Test: The Elements 
A few preliminary observations about the proposed test and how it is 
designed to function are in order before addressing its specific elements. As 
illustrated above, most of the proposed criteria for gross negligence and 
willful misconduct are not novel concepts. Rather, they are particularized 
derivatives of existing legal principles culled from doctrinal regimes that 
serve the same over-arching functions as do these terms. What is unique is 
their collective use as an analytical framework for gross negligence or will-
ful misconduct when these terms are applied to certain complex, high-risk 
scenanos. 
Several common features of gross negligence and willful misconduct 
have consistently emerged from their usage. These include a high magni-
tude of harm (an objective component), awareness of the danger (a subjec-
tive component), and indifference to the harm that the danger poses tooth-
ers (a morally blameworthy component).288 However Byzantine the varying 
existing formulations of gross negligence and willful misconduct are, these 
three traits regularly course through most iterations. As a result, these three 
characteristics are incorporated into three keystone elements of the proposed 
test. 
The elements of the test are proposed as a two-tiered analysis to assist 
the fact-finder in determining whether defendant's actions constitute gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. The first three elements are considered 
essential prerequisites to such a finding. Accordingly, the first level of anal-
ysis would require a prima facie showing by plaintiff on each of these ele-
ments. The absence of prima facie evidentiary support on any one of these 
elements would preclude a finding of gross negligence or willful miscon-
286. /d. at 1027-28. 
287. See 3 BEST ET AL., supra note 282, § 19.1 0[3][b ][i]. 
288. See supra text accompanying notes 155-165. 
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duct. Conversely, a robust evidentiary showing on all three elements would 
support such a finding without the need for further inquiry. 
The next three elements, in descending order of evidentiary weight, 
are considered variables that may or may not be present in a given case. The 
presence of any one or more of these variables could affect the weight given 
to the first-tier elements. For example, a weak prima facie showing on one 
or more of the first-tier elements may be considerably strengthened by 
strong evidence of one or more of the second-tier elements. In this respect, 
the two tiers may be viewed as an informal sliding scale with the first-tier 
factors bearing an inverse probative relationship to those in the second tier. 
As the quantum of evidence on the first-tier factors increases, a weaker evi-
dentiary showing on the second-tier factors would be permissible. When 
evidence on the first-tier factors is slight, a stronger showing on the second-
tier factors would be required.289 
The last element, exigent circumstances, is a catch-all mitigating vari-
able that would tend to justify, explain, or excuse the improvident actions 
taken by the defendant. 
1. First-Tier Factors 
a. Existence of an Unusually High Degree of Potential Harm 
As the jurisprudence makes clear, extraordinary risk demands extraor-
dinary care.290 The failure to exercise care that is commensurate with the 
risk is negligence, and when the magnitude of likely harm is exceptionally 
high, that failure equates to gross negligence. Quite simply, there can be no 
gross negligence in the absence of an unusually high degree of prospective 
harm. Conduct that presents an extraordinarily grave risk of harm is a foun-
dational, sine qua non element of gross negligence and willful miscon-
duct.291 Here, it is similarly treated as an absolute prerequisite. 
This element would require an objective assessment of the magnitude 
of prospective harm to persons or property. In making this assessment the 
fact-finder may consider the potential gravity of the harm in light of the 
overall activity setting (for example, deep-water drilling) or as a function of 
specific conduct (for example, cementing a well) within that high-risk set-
ting. 
289. Cf William M. Richman, Review Essay, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1328, 1345 (1984) 
(proposing a similar sliding scale test for evaluating defendant's forum contacts in the deter-
mination of specific and general jurisdiction); see also Simard, supra note I 02, at 361. 
290. See generally Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1998). 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 155-165. 
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b. Awareness of the Danger 
This element is also an indispensable predicate for gross negligence 
and willful misconduct. The actor's consciousness of the threat of signifi-
cant injury to others or their property is a distinguishing hallmark that sepa-
rates gross negligence or worse from the momentary inattention or inadvert-
ence of ordinary negligence. It requires actual subjective awareness of the 
danger on the actor's part. The specificity level of the actor's awareness can 
significantly affect this element's probative value. For example, a non-
specific, general sense of foreboding may not be sufficient. Whereas, 
awareness that a particular type of harm could come about in a particular 
manner would likely suffice. Of course, there are many degrees of cogni-
zance in between the two opposite poles of this awareness continuum. 
Where the actor's subjective awareness falls on that continuum will deter-
mine the probative impact of this element. 
Were it not for the unfortunate conflation of the terms gross negli-
gence and willful misconduct, as discussed above,292 awareness of an ex-
tremely high degree of harm and the failure to take reasonable steps to avert 
it would be sufficient to find gross negligence in most cases. There would 
be no need to assess the actor's moral perspective of the risk because "neg-
ligence" is conduct, not a state of mind. 293 However, because courts and 
legislatures have so consistently and thoroughly imbued gross negligence 
with the morally blameworthy attribute of willful or wanton misconduct, a 
criterion for determining the actor's culpable state of mind is necessary. The 
next criterion serves that purpose. 
c. Indifference Towards the Risk ofHarm 
An actor's failure to exercise the care necessary to avoid a known ab-
normally dangerous condition does not necessarily mean he was apathetic to 
the risk of harm. Thus, a third element critical to a finding of gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct is the actor's indifference to the risk of serious 
harm that his actions pose to others. This is another subjectively assessed 
element that invokes a moral inquiry into the path chosen by defendant.294 It 
is also one that merges the actor's act with his state of mind.295 Indifference 
to the known injurious consequences of one's behavior is a defining feature 
courts consistently use to separate ordinary negligence from more culpable 
forms of careless misconduct. 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 122-142. 
293. See DOBBS, supra note 5, at 275. 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 155-165. 
295. See Martin, supra note 13, at 975. 
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As with awareness of the danger, the actor's complacency towards it 
has many permutations, levels, and underlying causes, all of which could 
affect its probative worth for assessing the moral blameworthiness of de-
fendant's actions. What is imperative here is that defendant's words or 
deeds evince some lack of concern for the safety of persons or property. The 
ultimate probative weight given this factor will be influenced by the quality 
of defendant's indifference depending on whether it more closely resembles 
a casual insouciance than a reckless or wanton disregard of the consequenc-
es. 
The probative assessment also necessitates an evaluation of any possi-
ble causes that tend to neutralize the defendant's seemingly complacent 
disposition towards the danger. An actor may ignore a potentially grave risk 
for a variety of reasons. Intentionally disregarding a risk is an indicator of 
indifference, but until we know its underlying cause, we have an incomplete 
picture of defendant's culpability.296 For example, one defendant may have 
deliberately ignored a danger because he was overruled by a concurrent 
tortfeasor with operational control over the injury producing activity297 or 
because countervailing operational exigencies may have forced the defend-
ant to proceed despite the danger or caused him to miscalculate the pro-
spects for harm. While such explanations may not necessarily absolve the 
actor of ordinary negligence, they could negate the culpability feature that is 
so essential to a gross negligence/willful misconduct determination.298 On 
the other hand, when the explanations for defendant's disregard of the dan-
ger are grounded in cost- or time-saving considerations, the requisite culpa-
bility may be readily found. The next factor, which is the first and most 
weighty variable amongst the second-tier criteria, prompts just such an in-
quiry into the presence of any fiscal motives behind the actor's conduct. 
2. Second-Tier Factors 
a. Conduct Motivated by Strategic Financial Concerns 
Financially motivated misconduct is a key indication of morally 
blameworthy behavior that crosses the divide between ordinary and gross 
negligence, thus warranting punitive sanctions an,d augmented liability.299 
296. The analysis here resembles the criminal law's dual requirements of mens rea 
and actus reus for determining whether an actor has committed a crime. 
297. Several of the BP's subcontractors, who are co-defendants in the BP litigation, 
have complained that they were regularly overruled by the BP "company man" with respect 
to key decisions on the design, monitoring, and cementing of the well. See discussion supra 
Part II; infra Part V. 
298. These same considerations could also have exculpatory value under the exigent 
circumstances element. See discussion infra Subsection IV.B.2.d. 
299. See supra text accompanying notes 251-258. 
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Given the interpretative prominence of fiscal motives as a major factor in 
the gross negligence/willful misconduct jurisprudence and in punitive dam-
ages statutory schemes, it should be accorded the greatest weight of all the 
variable factors in the second-tier analysis. Another reason for its suggested 
weightiness is that fiscal pressures often drive operational decisions in the 
type of high-risk enterprises for which this proposed test is most useful. The 
potential expanded liability costs that accompany a finding of gross negli-
gence/willful misconduct would more effectively deter unreasonable risk 
taking if the risky conduct's associated cost savings were greatly out-
weighed by the potential liability. The deterrence efficacy of enhanced 
damages is considerably strengthened if the actor knows beforehand that his 
conduct leading to a mishap will be specifically evaluated for its profit-
driven qualities. Just as profit maximization often drives operational deci-
sions and overrides safety protocol, liability avoidance could influence the 
decision makers to place a greater value on safety, but only if the predictors 
for compounded liability are certain and specific. This factor and its relative 
weightiness provide the necessary specificity and certainty as a predictive 
criterion for gross negligence and willful misconduct. 
b. Conduct Consistent with a Pattern or Practice of Disregarding 
Safety 
A pattern or practice of disregarding safety could affect the probative 
weight of the preceding factor, in particular, when it appears that defend-
ant's misconduct may have been financially motivated. A fiscally driven 
decision that is uncharacteristic of an enterpriser's operational behavior or 
inconsistent with its otherwise vigorously enforced safety protocol may be 
considered an isolated aberration undeserving of a gross negligence/willful 
misconduct designation, depending on the quality and quantity of eviden-
tiary support on the other factors. However, if the actor's financially moti-
vated conduct is consistent with a regular pattern or practice of disregarding 
safety concerns, such a showing would militate strongly in favor of the 
more culpable gross negligence label. The defendant's safety record and 
safety protocol, as measured by industry and regulatory standards, and safe-
ty culture would be relevant considerations. 
Even when there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of strate-
gic financial decision making, evidence of an enterprise's systemic culture 
of tolerance for safety lapses, whatever the reason, could affect the weight 
given to the other factors. For example, if the activity setting is so abnor-
mally dangerous that it qualifies for strict liability treatment, a poor safety 
record or culture further heightens an already high magnitude of potential 
harm. With respect to the indifference factor, if defendant's complacency 
towards the risk of harm is corroborated by an enterprise's cultural apathy 
towards safety, the evidence of indifference would be fortified. 
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c. Aggregate Gross Negligence: Multiple Acts of Ordinary 
Negligence 
155 
Aggregate gross negligence, as formulated in this Article, is a relative-
ly novel theory of gross negligence. It is the only criterion in the proposed 
framework that is not traceable to the related doctrines of punitive damages, 
strict liability, or comparative fault. Moreover, neither the term itself, nor 
any corollary, has been found in the jurisprudence. Nonetheless, a few 
courts have embraced the concept that multiple acts of ordinary negligence, 
when considered collectively, may constitute gross negligence.300 The hold-
ings in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marshall and Apache Corp. v. 
Moore reflect this proposition.301 Each of those courts emphasized that the 
cumulative effect of a series of acts was indicative of defendant's conscious 
indifference towards the rights or safety of others, thus providing the culpa-
ble state of mind element necessary to find gross negligence.302 
The courts in Williamson v. McKenna and Water Quality Insurance 
Syndicate v. United States also held that gross negligence could arise from a 
series of acts, but neither court offered any guidance or criteria for making 
such a determination?03 Rather, the Williamson court merely recognized that 
a succession of negligent acts may provide the requisite reckless state of 
mind for gross negligence.304 The court's rationale in Water Quality was 
even more cryptic. In reviewing an agency's finding of gross negligence 
under the applicable rational basis standard, the court summarily held, with-
out further explanation, that there was a "rational connection" between the 
facts and the agency's finding that the defendant acted with gross negli-
gence. 305 Therefore, while all of the aforementioned courts support the con-
cept that multiple acts of ordinary negligence may equate to gross negli-
gence, each of them stopped well shy of explaining how the cumulative 
300. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 699 S.W.2d 896, 903 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1985); Apache Corp. v. Moore, 891 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), vacated, 517 U.S. 
1217 (1996); see also Water Quality Ins. Syndicate v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 2d 108, 
112, 115-16 (D. Mass. 2009) (concluding that defendant was grossly negligent based upon a 
series of acts); Martin, supra note 13, at 997-98, I 018-19. 
301.- Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 699 S.W.2d at 903; see generally Apache Corp., 891 
S.W.2d 671. 
302. In Aetna, the court noted that defendant's multiple acts of ordinary negligence 
demonstrated a "conscious indifference" to plaintiffs rights. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 699 
S.W.2d at 903. Similarly, the court in Apache held that "[o]rdinary negligence is raised to the 
level of gross negligence by the mental attitude, i.e., the conscious indifference, of the de-
fendant to the rights, welfare and safety of others." Apache Corp., 891 S.W.2d at 681 (cita-
tion omitted). 
303. See Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 71 (Or. 1960); Water Quality Ins. 
Syndicate, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
304. Williamson, 354 P.2d at 71. 
305. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 114-15. 
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impact of several acts would interact with other facts and circumstances to 
justify a finding of gross negligence. 
Incidents like the Macondo well blowout are more likely to result 
from a series of successive lapses than from a single isolated act.306 The 
precipitating negligence is more apt to be systematic rather than episodic. 307 
The facts in Apache Corp. are illustrative and eerily similar to the series of 
failures that led to the Macondo well blowout. In the Apache Corp. incident, 
no tests were conducted to determine the cause or origin of metal shavings 
found in the drilling mud.308 Metal shavings frequently indicate that worn 
casings or tubing are allowing the metal of the drill pipe to rub and shave 
off, thereby compromising the equipment in the hole.309 The well later expe-
rienced a "kick" as the well began to flow, causing cement that was placed 
to secure the liner at the bottom of the hole to back up into the intermediate 
casing, where it hardened.310 The cement was drilled out of the casing, but 
no tests were conducted to determine if the casing had been damaged.311 
Upon completion of the well, a pressure leak at the surface denoted pressure 
on the backside of the well, placing the intermediate casing under stress.312 
Ignoring the drilling superintendent's recommendation to pull the tubing 
and repair the leak, Apache conducted a single test, which failed to deter-
mine the source of the leak.313 Without any further effort to find the source 
of or to repair the leak, which Apache knew would create pressure that 
would stress the intermediate casings, the company plugged the well to 
await connection to a pipeline.314 To relieve the pressure caused by the leak, 
the company had a.casing relief valve installed on the well.315 The relief 
valve ultimately failed because of the lack of nitrogen upon which it de-
pended to operate properly, causing pressure to build and precipitating the 
blowout_3'6 The court found that the company's failure to properly monitor 
the relief valve and flow of nitrogen evinced a conscious indifference to the 
safety of others from which defendant's mental culpability could be in-
ferred.317 
306. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at vii. 
307. Id. 
308. Apache Corp. v. Moore, 891 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), vacated, 







315. !d. at 675. 
316. Id. 
317. /d.at683. 
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Support for the proposition that acts of ordinary negligence in high-
risk environments warrant elevated punishment may also be gleaned from 
the criminal penalties provisions of the CW A, which criminalizes negli-
gence.318 Unlike the treble civil penalties for gross negligence under the 
CW A, its criminal penalties provisions are not triggered by "gross," as op-
posed to ordinary, negligence.319 In fact, the Ninth Circuit held that ordinary 
negligence could satisfy a finding of criminal liability under the CW A be-
cause the defendant was engaged in conduct where mere negligence posed a 
danger to the public at large.320 In United States v. Hanousek, the defendant 
acted in a supervisory role over the maintenance and construction of a rail-
road track.321 The defendant's failure to properly protect a high-pressure 
petroleum products pipeline that ran parallel to the railroad tract during the 
course of the project was deemed such a danger to the public at large that 
mere negligence was sufficient to impose criminalliability.322 In its reason-
ing, the court emphasized that the '"type of conduct that a reasonable person 
should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously 
threaten the community's health or safety"' warranted criminal negligence 
liability for acts of even ordinary negligence.323 What is particularly instruc-
tive from this application of the CW A is the court's focus on the risk to the 
public welfare. The concern for excessive risk is the driving factor behind 
imposition of criminal liability for ordinary negligence, and it is a well-
established doctrine.324 It easily follows that multiple acts of ordinary negli-
gence during a highly regulated activity, which already poses a potentially 
large public hazard and exponentially magnifies the risk, could compel a 
finding of gross negligence and the enhanced civil sanctions it brings. 
318. See Brigid Harrington, Note, A Proposed Narrowing of the Clean Water Act's 
Criminal Negligence Provisions: It's Only Human?, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 643, 645-
46 (2005). 
319. The CWA provides that any person who "negligently" discharges oil into navi-
gable waters_ of the United States, inter alia, may be punished by fine, imprisonment, or both. 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(l)(A) (2006). 
320. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999). 
321. !d. at 1119. 
322. /d. at 1122. 
323. /d. at 1121-22 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,433 (1985)). 
324. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922) ("[W]here one deals with 
others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or 
poison, the policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment 
of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells."); 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,281 (1943) ("In the interest of the larger good it 
puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in respon-
sible relation to a public danger." (citing Balint, 258 U.S. at 250)); Staples v. United States, 
511 U.S. 600,607 n.3 (reiterating that public welfare statutes may "dispens[e] with" a "men-
tal element"). 
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As proposed here, the aggregate effect of several acts of ordinary neg-
ligence is not interpreted as restrictively as it was in Aetna Casualty & Sure-
ty Co. and Apache Corp. 325 Rather, its use as a criterion for gross negligence 
is multifaceted. It is a variable that may lend probative weight to a variety of 
factors beyond just the defendant's indifference to the risk of harm. It may 
affect the weight of objective or subjective factors alike. For instance, the 
degree of potential harm from a series of negligent acts may be substantially 
elevated when committed in an exceptionally high-risk environment. The 
multiplicity of negligent acts, even those considered as "ordinary," increases 
the likelihood of "extraordinary" harm. 
Also, each successive act of ordinary negligence may forewarn the ac-
tor of a specific impending danger, which, if ignored, could lead to serious 
harm. The well blowout that occurred in Apache Corp. involved a combina-
tion of negligent acts and omissions remarkably similar to those that alleg-
edly caused the Macondo well explosion, both in terms of the types of mis-
conduct and the increasingly ominous portents of each successive misstep. 
Such a finding would affect the depth and specificity of defendant's subjec-
tive awareness of the danger. 
Repeated acts of ordinary negligence may also be indicative of, and 
consistent with, a pattern or practice of unsafe conduct by the defendant, 
thus adding to that factor's probative weight. In sum, the aggregate effect of 
multiple acts of ordinary negligence should be treated as a multidimensional 
variable, one of several factors that a court may use to determine gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct. This variable should be accorded roughly 
equal weight as the preceding pattern of disregarding safety factor. 
d. Exigent Circumstances 
This variable is suggested as a justification mechanism whenever exi-
gent circumstances either compel the actor to act hastily without sufficient 
opportunity to consider the potential injurious consequences of his decisions 
or leave him without a safer alternative course of action. It is consistent with 
traditional negligence doctrine that considers exigent conditions in evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of an actor's conduct.326 Under the so-called "emer-
gency doctrine, ... [i]f an actor is confronted with a sudden and unforesee-
able emergency not of [his] own making, the [fact-finder] is permitted to 
consider the emergency as one of the circumstances relevant in determining 
whether the actor behaved reasonably.m27 In considering whether given 
conduct constitutes gross negligence, the fact-finder determines whether the 
behavior was exceptionally unreasonable in light of the heightened risk. The 
325. See discussion· supra Subsection IV.B.2.c. 
326. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 196. 
327. See DOBBS supra note 5, at 304 (citations omitted). 
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effect of exigent circumstances in the test proposed here has more limited 
exculpatory value than it would in an ordinary negligence case. Here, it 
does not operate, as it may in a case of ordinary negligence, to completely 
absolve the defendant of liability.328 Rather, it would mitigate a finding of 
gross negligence to that of ordinary negligence if the emergency circum-
stances tend to negate the culpability that would ordinarily be inferred from 
the actor's behavior in the absence of the exigency. For example, emergen-
cy circumstances which impede deliberative decision making could lessen 
the extent of the actor's awareness of the danger or nullify his otherwise 
apparent indifference to it. 
V. APPLYING THE TEST TO THE BP LITIGATION 
Any novel, untested legal theory or analytical framework presumably 
benefits more from an empirical rather than a purely fictional application. 
Its utility and functionality are more accurately evaluated when applied 
against actual, as opposed to hypothetical and, inevitably, artificial, factual 
settings. The purpose of this Part is to illustrate how the proposed test for 
gross negligence and willful misconduct might theoretically apply to some 
of the actual facts thus far discovered in the investigation of the Deepwater 
Horizon rig explosion. 
This Part is not, however, intended to prognosticate or attribute fault 
to any of the parties involved in the BP litigation. The facts referenced here 
are based largely upon testimony given before various federal agencies in-
vestigating the cause of the oil spill and efforts to contain it. It bears empha-
sis that these are not judicial findings of fact that have been subject to full 
evidentiary and adversarial scrutiny in a trial setting. Consequently, the 
facts mentioned here are treated as mere allegations used solely for illustra-
tive purposes. Nor does this analysis address legal causation issues. It would 
be inappropriate to draw any liability conclusions based upon this purely 
conjectural illustration.329 Bearing this caveat in mind, the proposed test for 
gross negligence and willful misconduct as applied to the Deepwater Hori-
zon incident might apply as illustrated below. 
328. This is not to say that under the emergency doctrine an actor suspected of gross-
ly negligent conduct could not also be completely absolved of negligence, gross or ordinary. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 196. 
329. The factual analysis is limited to the actions of BP for a couple of reasons. BP 
had chief operational control of the Macondo well operations and ultimate decision-making 
authority. Also, evaluating the actions and roles of the numerous subcontractors involved 
would prohibitively lengthen and overly complicate this academic discussion. That being 
said, the conclusions reached are not to suggest that BP was solely responsible for the Deep-
water Horizon rig explosion or that other parties may not share responsibility for the event. 
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A. Unusually High Degree of Potential Harm 
Even before the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, exploring and drill-
ing for oil in water depths over 1000 feet and several miles below the ocean 
floor was commonly perceived to be a risk-intensive endeavor.330 Moreover, 
even though deep-water well blowouts are relatively infrequent occurrences, 
such an event poses a potentially catastrophic threat of harm to persons, 
property, and the environment. This is due to, among other things, the high-
ly toxic and volatile hydrocarbons such as oil and gas being extracted miles 
below the seabed, the difficulty of averting, controlling, and cleaning up a 
spill at such depths, and the potentially irreparable damage a spill can cause 
to waterways and adjacent lands. Given the known highly dangerous profile 
of deep-water drilling, a trier of fact would likely conclude, as an objective 
assessment, that this activity presented an exceptionally high magnitude of 
prospective harm.331 
In order to better understand the analysis of the remaining factors, a 
brief overview of how a deep-water well is drilled would be helpful. The 
drilling rig lowers a drill pipe (also known as a drill string) with a drill bit 
attached to its end. 332 The drill bit bores into the sea floor and the subsea 
rock formation to make a hole referred to as the wellbore.333 The rig installs 
large diameter pipe, known as "casing," into the wellbore to prevent the 
hole from caving in and to flow hydrocarbons to the surface.334 The rig then 
uses a "riser," which is a large pipe that connects the well at the seafloor 
with the surface equipment. 335 The riser guides the drill string down into the 
well and provides a conduit for drilling fluid coming up from the wellbore 
for processing.336 As drilling progresses, the rig sets additional casings (sec-
tions of pipe) that are slightly smaller in diameter than the wellbore.337 
After each casing string is set, it is bonded into place by pumping ce-
ment down the drill string, out the bottom of the casing, and back up into 
the annular space (the space between the pipe and the hole or between the 
pipe and the casing).338 Cementing is a crucial element of well design and 
330. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
331. The abnormally dangerous quality of drilling for oil, as well as handling and 
transporting it, at sea is also reinforced by the strict liability imposed on this activity under 
federal statutes such as the OP A, the CW A, and their state statutory counterparts. 
332. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 14. 
333. !d. 
334. CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 184. 
335. ld. at 192. 
336. !d. 
337. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 15 ("The outermost casing near the top of 
the well can be up to four feet in diameter, and the innermost ... casing [string] near the 
bottom of the well can be less than six inches [wide]."). 
338. !d. at 16. 
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essential to safe drilling operations.339 It maintains the integrity of the well-
bore by preventing collapse of the hole already drilled, preventing hydro-
carbons from flowing through the annular space, and protecting the sides of 
the wellbore from pressure exerted by drilling fluids called "drilling mud," 
which is pumped down the drill pipe through the drill bit nozzles during 
drilling.340 Drilling mud lubricates and cools the drill bit during drilling and 
"plays a critical role in controlling the hydrocarbon pressure in [the] 
well."341 The weight of the column of mud exerts pressure that counterbal-
ances the pressure(s) exerted from the surrounding hydrocarbon for-
mation. 342 If the mud weight is too low, hydrocarbon fluids can enter the 
well, causing what is known as a "kick."343 However, if the mud weight is 
too high, it can fracture the surrounding rock formation, potentially causing 
"lost returns"-mud leaking into the formation. 344 
Upon completion of drilling and evaluation of an exploratory well for 
its production potential, the operator typically seals the well by pumping 
cement (a "cement plug") and installing mechanical plugs, a procedure 
known as "plugging and abandoning" the welt.345 If the operator believes the 
well will produce sufficient hydrocarbons, it may elect to perform "tempo-
rary abandonment" procedures, which enable the drilling rig to leave the 
well site and return later to complete the well for production.346 The Macon-
do well blowout occurred while BP was engaged in the temporary aban-
donment process. 347 
B. Awareness of the Danger 
BP experienced "a number of operational problems during drilling and 
temporary abandonment procedures at the Macondo well, including kicks, 
stuck pipe, lost returns, equipment leaks, cost overruns, well scheduling and 
logistical issues, personnel changes and conflicts" and last-minute changes 
in procedure.348 These regularly occurring difficulties led rig personnel to 
refer to Macondo as the "well from hell."349 The problem-plagued notoriety 
of the Macon do well arguably imputed heightened concern for the prospects 
of a blowout.· 
339. ld. 
340. ld. at 15-16. 




345. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 14. 
346. ld. 
347. ld. at 2. 
348. Id. at 75. 
349. Id. 
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There were certain events and management decisions that provided 
notice of particular dangers and strongly suggest BP was aware of the risks 
those dangers posed. One threshold decision that should have alerted BP to 
increased risk was the choice of a long-string casing design rather than the 
use of a liner, which would have provided an additional barrier to oil and 
gas channeling up the wellbore to the surface.350 While it is unclear "wheth-
er the decision to use the long string well design contributed directly to the 
blowout, ... it did increase the difficulty of obtaining a reliable primary 
cement job in several respects, and primary cement failure was a direct [and 
proximate] cause of the blowout."351 This decision "should have led BP ... 
to be on heightened alert for any signs of primary cement failure."352 
Another risk factor that should have prompted elevated vigilance by 
BP was the decision to use six rather than the twenty-one centralizers rec-
ommended by Halliburton, the cementing subcontractor.353 A centralizer is a 
device that fits around the casing to ensure the casing stays centered in the 
open hole.354 "Centralizers are crucial components [to] ensuring a good ce-
ment job."355 The fifteen additional centralizers were ordered after computer 
350. See CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 26. "The production casing runs from the bottom 
of the well up to the wellhead." BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 37. "There are two 
general design options for production casing-a long string design or a liner design." ld A 
long string design consists of casing that extends from the bottom of the well to the top of the 
well bore. Id A liner casing design consists of a shorter string of casing that extends from the 
bottom of the well to just inside the next largest string of casing where it is anchored to the 
casing above by a liner hanger that forms a barrier to any influx of wellbore fluids. CAVNAR, 
supra note 82, at 189. In contrast, the only barriers in the long string design are the cement at 
the bottom of the casing and the casing hanger at the surface./d 
351. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 115 (footnotes omitted). "The 
failure of the cement barrier allowed hydrocarbons to flow up the well bore, through the riser 
and onto the rig, resulting in the blowout." BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at I. The in-
creased risks associated with the long string design were explained as follows: 
First, the long string required the cement to travel through a longer stretch of steel 
casing-roughly 12,000 feet longer-before reaching its final destination, poten-
tially increasing the risk of cement contamination. Second, because it can require 
higher cement pumping pressure, a long string design can lead to the section of 
lower cement volumes, lower densities, and lower pump rates. Third, the cement 
job at the bottom of a long string is· more difficult to remediate than one at the bot-
tom of a liner. 
OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 325 n.l28. 
352. Jd at 115. 
353. See, e.g., id at 118 . 
.354. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 47. 
355. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 96. Centered casing facilitates 
efficient placement of cement around the casing string. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 
47. Even in a straight hole (such as the Macondo well), the production casing does not al-
ways align exactly with the center of the wellbore. !d. Therefore, without centralizers the 
casing could rest along the sides of the wellbore and cause void spaces in the cement job 
(i.e., "channeling"). !d. 
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modeling suggested that the casing would need more than six centralizers to 
avoid channeling.356 Based on computer simulations, Halliburton recom-
mended that BP use twenty-one centralizers to minimize the risk of channel-
ing due to gas flow. 357 BP was aware of the increased risk of using fewer 
than the recommended number of centralizers but declined to follow the 
recommendation. 358 
There were several other portents of danger during operations at the 
Macondo well that alerted BP to the increased prospect of a blowout. Com-
pany records and testimony from rig personnel establish that multiple 
"kicks" occurred during drilling and temporary abandonment operations.359 
A kick occurs when fluids from the pores of a rock formation (which can 
include water, gas, or oil) flows into the wellbore as a result of pressure in 
the wellbore being lower than that of the surrounding formation.360 These 
fluids can then travel up through the wellbore, with the upward pressure 
risking a blowout if not quickly addressed.361 
Multiple lost returns experienced by BP throughout the drilling at the 
Macondo well also signaled trouble.362 Lost returns occur when drilling mud 
escapes from the wellbore, rather than circulating back to the surface, be-
cause of weakness or fractures in the surrounding rock formations. 363 While 
not uncommon, a lost return is a key indicator to monitor the well closely to 
ensure that well and formation integrity are being maintained. 364 
BP's engineers aboard the Deepwater Horizon "consistently ran 
roughshod over subcontractors" who openly lamented the potentially cata-
strophic consequences of BP's decisions.365 "This is how it's going to be," 
one BP engineer reportedly said in overruling a subcontractor on the critical 
question of when to replace drilling mud, which prevents hydrocarbons 
356. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 97. 
357. !d. 
358. BP's reasons for disregarding Halliburton's recommendation were twofold. 
First, BP did not want to lose another ten hours it would take to install the additional central-
izers. !d. Secondly, more centralizers increased the possibility that one of the parts could 
come off during installation and clog the wellbore, which would be a bigger operational 
hassle to remedy than remediating a poor cementing job caused by too few centralizers. See 
id.; see also BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 48. In doing so, BP unnecessarily in-
creased risk, compromising safety for operational efficiencies. 
359. !d. at 75. 
360. CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 188-89. 
361. !d. 
362. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 93-94. 
363. !d. When a lost return happens, the rig has to stop drilling until the crew can seal 
the fracture. !d. 
364. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 33. 
365. Joe Nocera, Talking Business, BP Ignored the Omens of Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20 I 0/06/19/business/19nocera.html?pagewanted 
=all. 
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from flowing up the well, with seawater.366 BP's decision to displace the 
dense, heavy drilling mud with the much lighter seawater before the well 
was sealed unnecessarily and substantially increased the risk of a blowout.367 
Such regularly occurring risk-related operational skirmishes between BP 
and its subcontractors made BP aware of the potential dangers involved. 
C. Indifference Towards the Risk of Harm 
But, who cares, it's done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and we'll get a 
good cement job. I would rather have to squeeze [remediate the cement job] than 
get stuck above the [wellhead]. So Guide is right on the risk/reward equation.368 
The decision to use the significantly less expensive long string casing 
design rather than the more costly liner design option also evinced a finan-
cially induced indifference to the known risks·of drilling in ultra-deep water 
and in an exceptionally challenging geological formation.369 
BP's response to the multiple lost returns also reveals a conscious dis-
regard of the danger signaled by those events. Abnormal pressure zones 
identified by mud loss events often prompt drilling engineers to change the 
well design and casing setting points.l70 Despite the known mud losses ex-
perienced in the well, BP also failed to take added precautions such as es-
~ablishing additional barriers during cementing, a failure deemed to be a 
"contributing cause [to] the blowout."371 
Indifference to known risks may also be reasonably inferred from 
BP's insistence upon using a cement slurry design that was foamed with 
nitrogen, a design with which it had little experience.372 Several lab tests, 
which are essential to determining the cement's stability, confirmed that the 
slurry was unstable.373 Given the inherent uncertainty of cementing, even 
366. !d. 
367. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 120; see also Ian Urbina, BP 
Used Riskier Method to Seal Well Before Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 l 0/05/27 /us/27rig.html. 
368. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 116. 
369. !d. at 91. 
370. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 33. 
371. /d. at 69. 
372. See OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at I 00. This lightweight, nitri-
fied cement is generally used on shallower strings of pipe where lost circulation and water 
flow are significant problems; it is not typically used as completion cement deep in the well. 
CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 27. 
373. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 101, 117. It should be noted that 
the Oil Spill Commission Report suggested that Halliburton may not have timely shared the 
final test results with BP before the cement was poured. !d. at 101-02. However, the 
BOEMRE REPORT concluded that BP was apprised of several pilot test results that indicated 
cement instability. See BOEMRE REPORT supra note 89, at 43. Halliburton was still waiting 
for the results of the final comprehensive strength analysis on April 19 and told BP such. !d. 
Nevertheless, BP continued the cement job without waiting for the final test results. !d. 
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under optimal conditions, the specific risk factors surrounding the problem-
atic Macondo well operations, and the critical importance of the cement 
plug as the only barrier to hydrocarbon intrusion under the Macondo's ques-
tionable well design, proceeding with the volatile cement slurry further 
demonstrates BP's indifference to the risk of harm. In addition, the Oil Spill 
Commission Report concluded that "[t]he overall complacency of the 
Deepwater Horizon crew was a possible contributing cause of the kick de-
tection failure."374 
D. Conduct Motivated by Strategic Financial Concerns 
There is substantial evidence that many of the decisions that contribut-
ed to the explosion were made primarily to save costs and time. The Deep-
water Horizon's day rate at the time of the blowout was $533,495 and total 
daily operating costs were approximately $1 million.375 Because of the many 
problems encountered with the Macondo well, the project was already thir-
ty-eight days behind schedule and $58 million over budget on the day of the 
blowout.376 The BOEMRE Report found that in the weeks before the blow-
out, BP "made a series of operational decisions that reduced costs and in-
creased risk[s]."377 Some of the decisions which saved costs and decreased 
rig time while escalating the risk included: (1) the decision to use the long 
string casing design versus the liner, which reduced well-completion costs 
by $7 million to $10 million;378 (2) the use of six versus twenty-one central-
izers which saved the additional ten hours it would have taken to install 
another fifteen centralizers;379 (3) the timing of the lock-down sleeve instal-
lation which saved the company $2.2 million;380 (4) the use of lost circula-
tion materials as a spacer, which saved the cost of having to dispose of the 
374. !d. at 196. 
375. !d. at 18. 
376. /d.at19. 
377. !d. at 178. 
378. !d. at 38. The BOEMRE Report was inconclusive as to whether this decision 
increased risk. !d. at 179. 
379. OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 97. 
380. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 85. A lock-down sleeve is a device that 
"connects and holds the production casing to the wellhead during production, thereby pro-
tecting the connection from the pressures generated by a flowing well." !d. at 78. They are 
typically installed by lower cost rigs that are used mainly for completion work rather than by 
a drilling rig like the Deepwater Horizon. !d. BP initially did not intend on using a lock-
down sleeve, but decided otherwise "when it was shown that doing so would likely save 5.5 
days of rig time and approximately $2.2 million .... [T]his cost-saving decision may have 
led to further complications encountered during the temporary abandonment procedures ... 
. "!d. at 78-79. 
166 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:103 
materials onshore;381 (5) the decision to forego a cement evaluation log, 
which saved the subcontractor costs to perform the test and the additional 
time necessary to complete it;382 and (6) the decision to limit the circulation 
of drilling mud through the wellbore before cementing.383 The Oil Commis-
sion Report similarly provided nine examples of decisions, including some 
of the aforementioned ones, which increased risks while potentially saving 
time.384 
Each of the federal investigations referenced here have concluded that 
much of BP's decision making was financially motivated. Based on the 
evidence adduced, much of it coming from BP's own internal documents 
and the testimony of its personnel, the conclusion that BP was acutely and 
exclusively focused on the fiscal repercussions of every major operational 
decision is inescapable.385 Accordingly, the evidentiary weight of this factor 
is considerable and would militate strongly in support of a finding of gross 
negligence. The strength of its probative value would also comfortably 
381. !d. at 87. Displacing the drilling mud from the riser required "the use of spacer 
fluid, which is used to separate the drilling mud from the seawater during displacement." !d. 
BP chose to use a blend of "leftover lost circulation material that had been mixed on the rig" 
and "used to prevent additional lost returns at the well. BP had never used this type of spacer 
before, and it did not know whether the spacer would be compatible with the synthetic based 
mud that it was displacing" or the "long-term stability of the interface between the spacer 
and the seawater." !d. BP chose this novel use of lost circulation material solely to avoid the 
additional time and costs associated with onshore disposal. !d. BP's own post-blowout inves-
tigation concluded that this spacer material caused viscous material to be present across the 
choke and kill lines during the negative pressure test, possibly plugging the kill line. !d. at 
88. The choke line is a pipe that serves as a conduit for fluids to flow from the well to the 
surface through the choke manifold. CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 184. The kill line serves as a 
conduit through which heavier drill mud can be forced into the well to stop the flow of kick 
fluids. !d. at 189. 
382. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 59. A cement evaluation log is used to 
evaluate the quality of a cement job and whether the cement in the annular space set up 
properly. !d. The log detects problems, which can then be remediated by pumping additional 
cement. !d. BP canceled the bond log even though Schlumberger, the subcontractor that 
would have performed it, had been pre-positioned on the rig to run the log. !d. at 60. 
383. See id. at 179; see a/so OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at I 00. The 
most effective option for this step in the cementing process would have been to do a "bot-
toms-up" circulation of the mud through the wellbore, "meaning the rig crew would have 
pumped enough mud down the wellbore to bring mud originally at the bottom of the well all 
the way back up to the rig." !d. Such extensive circulation would have "clean[ed] the well-
bore and reduce[ d] the likelihood of channeling" and "allow[ ed] technicians ... to examine 
mud from the bottom of the well for hydrocarbon content before cementing." !d. BP engi-
neers, however, vetoed this preferred mud circulation technique because the longer circula-
tion process increased the prospects for more lost-returns events, which would have delayed 
the completion of cementing and increased its costs. !d. As a result, BP only circulated an 
estimated "350 barrels of mud before cementing, rather than the 2, 760 barrels needed to do a 
full bottoms up circulation." !d. 
384. !d. at 125. 
385. See supra text accompanying notes 377-384. 
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overcome a more tepid showing on any of the first-tier factors. As noted 
above, the supporting evidence on the first-tier factors is equally compel-
ling, though one might reasonably argue that the evidence of indifference is 
only of moderate weight or even equivocal. However, when viewed in light 
of BP's manifest and pervasive financially-driven conduct, any doubt as to 
whether or why BP proceeded in the face of known and unnecessary risks is 
easily resolved. 
E. Conduct Consistent with a Pattern or Practice of Disregarding Safety 
BP's fixation on saving costs and time came at the expense of com-
promising safety. Each of the above-mentioned cost-cutting or time-saving 
decisions increased risk without any correlating attention to the resultant 
safety implications.386 Nor were those decisions subjected to BP's formal 
risk assessment processes that it had in place.387 
The BOEMRE Report also highlighted seven incidents where BP was 
found to be in non-compliance with federal regulations governing well op-
erations, including the failure to protect, and unreasonably jeopardizing, 
public health, safety, life, property, and the environment.388 Another federal 
investigative report concluded that BP failed to rigorously analyze risks 
created by key decisions or to develop plans for mitigating those risks.389 As 
a result, decisions in the last month of operations were biased in favor of 
cost and time savings while increasing the risk of a blowout.390 
The Macondo well blowout was not BP's only catastrophic experience 
involving a disregard of unsafe conditions. In 2005, the Texas City refinery 
explosion that killed fifteen people was caused by unsafe and antiquated 
equipment designs, which BP had knowledge of well before the explosion, 
according to a report by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board.391 Incidents such 
as this, and now the Macondo well blowout, prompted one industry observ-
er to write: "BP has been plagued with safety and environmental violations 
and tragic accidents reflective of their cost-cutting culture and laser-sharp 
386. In its risk register, BP identified twenty-three risks while planning the well. 
BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 177. Every one of these risks was categorized by BP as 
a cost, production, or scheduling risk, rather than a "health and safety" risk, one of thecate-
gory choices on the risk register form. /d. For example, a well control problem was identified 
as a "cost" but not a "health and safety" risk. /d. 
387. /d. at 178. 
388. See id. at 173. 
389. NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, MACONDO: THE GULF OIL DISASTER 243 (2011) [hereinafter CHIEF COUNSEL'S 
REPORT]. 
390. !d. 
391. CAVNAR, supra note 82, at 68. BP was fined $87 million for safety violations 
and paid over $2 billion in legal claims in the Texas City Refinery incident. Jd. 
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focus on profits .... "392 The historical evidence of BP's entrenched indif-
ference to its own safety protocol, safety regulations, and unsafe working 
conditions strongly suggests that its decision making in the Macondo well 
blowout was consistent with a systemic unconcern for safety.393 According-
ly, this second-tier factor would firmly support a finding of gross negligence 
under the test. 
F. Aggregate Gross Negligence: Multiple Acts of Ordinary Negligence 
The BOEMRE Report identified literally dozens of negligent acts, 
omissions, and decisions by BP and others that were contributing, or possi-
bly contributing, causes of the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion.394 The 
above-mentioned failures are only a representative sampling of arguable 
misconduct. An additional noteworthy negligent act included BP's misin-
terpretation of the critically important negative-pressure test results, which 
are used to evaluate the integrity of the primary cementing of the well.395 
The test results clearly showed hydrocarbons were leaking into the well.396 
Yet BP failed to investigate or resolve the anomalies revealed in the test 
results.397 The negative-pressure test had even greater significance since BP 
sent the cement evaluation subcontractor back to shore after cancelling the 
cement evaluation log discussed above.398 The displacement of drilling mud 
with seawater before sealing the well also placed a significant premium on 
the negative-pressure test used to evaluate the integrity of the bottom hole 
cement, which was the only physical barrier in the well during the dis-
placement process.399 
The blowout was the collective product of numerous missteps and 
oversights by BP and others. 400 Each of these mistakes increased the risk of 
a blowout.401 In addition, the cumulative risk that resulted from many of 
BP's decisions was both unreasonably large and avoidable.402 Even if some 
of the misconduct could arguably be construed as ordinary rather than gross 
negligence, the sheer volume of errors exponentially increased the risk of a 
catastrophic event given the intrinsically high-risk nature of ultra-deep wa-
392. !d. at 63. Even before the Macondo well blowout, BP's abysmal safety and 
environmental records had earned it the reputation of a "rogue" operator. !d. 
393. See Popper, supra note 84, at 986-87. 
394. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 194-99. 
395. See OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 118. 
396. CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 389, at X. 
397. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at lll. 
398. See OIL SPILL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 118. 
399. !d. at 120. 
400. See id. at 115. 
401. See id. 
402. See id. 
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ter drilling. Multiple acts of ordinary negligence may constitute gross negli-
gence when their aggregate effect creates an unreasonable risk of excep-
tionally grave harm.403 The aggregate gross negligence in this case is com-
pelling and would provide yet another weighty second-tier factor that could 
counterbalance a lesser evidentiary showing on any of the first-tier factors, 
if needed. 
G. Exigent Circumstances 
Deep-water drilling regularly presents unexpected conditions, anoma-
lies, and other emergent circumstances that require swift remedial action 
and hyper vigilance to avert the risk of harm. However, as described above, 
in this case the vast bulk of the most serious risks encountered by BP were 
foreseeable and the direct result of its flawed decisions and practices.404 
Consequently, such self-imposed mayhem would not operate to mitigate 
otherWise grossly negligent misconduct to that of ordinary negligence. 
H. Reconciliation of the First and Second-Tier Factors 
A prima facie showing would likely be readily established on each of 
the first-tier factors in the proposed test. The magnitude of prospective harm 
and awareness of the danger factors are exceptionally strong based on the 
investigative findings to date. The indifference factor, while also solid, 
would likely be viewed as moderate in weight when tempered by considera-
tions such as confused areas of responsibility and in-fighting amongst BP 
personnel, operational disputes with the subcontractors, poor communica-
tion, inadequate risk assessment procedures, and ambiguity as to whether 
BP was timely provided certain test results on the instability of the cement 
slurry design.405 Such variables, if proven, could arguably lessen the weight 
of the indifference factor evidence. However, since the record is replete 
with demonstrable instances of fiscally induced complacency towards 
known dangers, a moderately strong prima facie showing of indifference 
could, nonetheless, be made. Under such a trial scenario, the prima facie 
case on the first-tier factors would be sufficient for a finding of gross negli-
gence even without consideration of a second-tier factors analysis. 
Each of the second-tier factors, in tum, are supported by substantial 
evidence that would result in a sound prima facie finding on each factor. 
When applied as variables against the first-tier factors, and in the absence of 
any legally cognizable exigent circumstances, an overall finding of gross 
negligence could undoubtedly be sustained. 
403. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.2.c. 
404. See discussion supra Sections V.A-F. 
405. BOEMRE REPORT, supra note 89, at 1-6. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial and appellate courts hearing claims related to the BP oil spill 
will face daunting challenges sorting through the maze of technically laced 
conduct by multiple decision makers with overlapping input into the highly 
specialized drilling and abandonment operations of the Macondo well. 
Much is at stake in the court's determination of whether gross negligence or 
willful misconduct caused this catastrophe.406 What the courts ultimately 
decide will have far-reaching implications for how safely future high-risk 
enterprises are conducted and the well-being of those communities placed in 
harm's way by these abnormally dangerous activities. The existing jurispru-
dence on what constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct lacks suf-
ficient clarity and consistency to adequately assist courts in interpreting 
those terms in a complex case like the BP litigation. 407 The proposed crite-
ria-guided framework for applying gross negligence and willful misconduct 
to the BP case, and future cases like it, should enable courts to more pre-
cisely determine wheths:r the behavior that caused the harm merits the more 
severe punishment these heightened degrees of fault serve to impose. 
406. See discussion supra Section I.E. 
407. See discussion supra Section III. B. 
